This case study delves into the crime situation in Barangay Little Baguio and the barangay council’s specific crime prevention response in the form of the patrol. In doing so, this case study aspires to provide the Barangay and its various stake holders a fresh comprehensive, systematic description of the crime situation and the efforts to address the crime situation in the barangay through the barangay patrol. The case study details the evolution of patrolling in the barangay, the causes, the process, maintenance, financing, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the patrol. These are done using a conceptual framework based on work of Ekblom, Stafford and Silverlock, Ballyntine and Fraser, and Wiles and Pease. Their works have been selectively reformulated to suit the barangay-level patrol. The framework’s highlight is the identification of five factors of success: leadership, consultation, manpower-training, funding, and equipment. The conceptual framework also precludes misconceptions by reiterating that patrol efforts is just one of many crime prevention efforts, while the latter in turn, is one of many avenues to achieve community safety.
The data shows a noticeable, but not a comprehensive decrease in crime rates after introduction of the reform variables. The data also shows that the new barangay leaders instituted reforms that can be categorized into the framework’s five success factors.
Three succinct answers to the hypotheses can be gleaned from the analysis of historical and quantitative data. Firstly, Little Baguio’s experience illustrates that mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime prevention.
Secondly, even if the data does not show crime decrease across the board, there is proof to believe that leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime. The analysis of the data reveals proof that the reform variables conform to the five success factors which have been based on scholarly literature. This finding supports an optimistic realization that a there is growing evidence that a barangay-level patrol can be predictably improved based on known variables. Also, we are informed that manipulating foreign literature to suit local realities can be productive when grounded in reason.
Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous assessment. For this reason, literature has been consulted to include warnings that can help stakeholders increase the patrol system’s anticipatory capacity, policy flexibility, and awareness of its horizons. Crime displacement, obsolescence, complacency, and sustainability of values, knowledge, best practices must be kept in mind.
Lastly, while the study opens up other possible research leads like the question of “distance from deterrence”, it also encourages further testing of the conceptual framework’s applicability to other Filipino barangay contexts. However, the Little Baguio barangay-level patrol’s noticeable success may be partly serendipitous and not structural. Hence, caveats against applicability are acknowledged to avoid packaging the Little Baguio patrol experience as a one-size fit all solution to patrol ineffectiveness anywhere.
Caveats Against Applicability to Other Barangays
The recommendations discussed above are only on the horizon of a patrol system which has already attained a certain level of success. But the road to achieving that certain level of success will surely vary among different barangays in the archipelago. The reasons of Little Baguio’s success may not be structural but serendipitous. Future studies may explore the applicability of this study’s findings to other barangays, especially to poorer barangays. Here are some caveats to guard against inappropriate stretching of the findings to other contexts.
1. LB is a relatively well off.
Though it cannot be said that the majority of Little Baguio’s residents are rich, many affluent families reside in the Barangay. This is clearly not the norm among the barangays in the country.
2. LB has many establishments.
Influential institutions like Xavier and ICA are close to Little Baguio. Furthermore, there are a significant number of entrepreneurial activities within the barangay. These establishments are potential resources for the barangay.
3. LB Chairman is well connected.
Among the most serendipitous is the current chairman’s considerable network of connections. Connections represent a potential source of spontaneous financing, pledges, donations and the like. This is crucial when the internal budget is barely sufficient to launch new projects or acquire new assets.
1. LB is a relatively well off.
Though it cannot be said that the majority of Little Baguio’s residents are rich, many affluent families reside in the Barangay. This is clearly not the norm among the barangays in the country.
2. LB has many establishments.
Influential institutions like Xavier and ICA are close to Little Baguio. Furthermore, there are a significant number of entrepreneurial activities within the barangay. These establishments are potential resources for the barangay.
3. LB Chairman is well connected.
Among the most serendipitous is the current chairman’s considerable network of connections. Connections represent a potential source of spontaneous financing, pledges, donations and the like. This is crucial when the internal budget is barely sufficient to launch new projects or acquire new assets.
Assesment of the Hypothesis
Firstly, mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime prevention, During the mid-90’s, Little Baguio was voted as one of San Juan’s most peaceful barangayas but the years leading to 2007 saw a rise in crimes. Indeed, mere presence is not enough to effect oticeable crime prevention.
Secondly, leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime. The inclusion of these variables in before mid 2008 noticeably changed the crime rates. The data does not reject this hypothesis but does not offer comprehensive results. The analysis has suggested the links between these variables and their effects on crime. At this point, there is sufficient reason to believe that in the Philippine’s context, these five success variables have a palpable effect on crime prevention just like the claims of the literature. However, a more satisifying elucidation will require data on crime rates of more years.
Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous assessment. Again the success in the mid-90’s and the spike of crimes in the years leading to 2007 confirm that there is a possibility for a reversal. The causes of these reversals are multitude. And if ever the current promising patrol reforms bloom into a period of security similar to the mid-90’s, the causes of the reformed patrol’s reversal into ineffectiveness remain to be seen – if ever such a reversal will occur notwithstanding the literature and this case study’s agreement that it is likely to occur. The following section gives an account of the literature’s analysis on these prospects.
Warnings: Future Vulnerabilities, Anticipated Possibilities
The vibrant community safety literature we have surveyed reveal empirically-compelling findings and documented cases about probable vulnerabilities, and anticipated possibilities usually encountered by crime prevention efforts like patrol systems that have already attained a level of success. While the previous sections give recommendations on how to improve the five identified success-factors of a barangay-level patrol system, this section tackles the probable predicaments the barangay will face when it is already around a certain level of success. Discussing these warnings is crucial in helping the stakeholders increase the patrol system’s anticipatory capacity, policy flexibility, and awareness of its horizons. Clearly, we stand to learn from the experiences distilled in the literature to better maneuver from known faulty policies, and ignorance.
Crime displacement.
Perhaps the most immediately relevant waning to the patrol system is the issue of crime displacement, which is the “alleged tendency of prevented crime to move to other locales.” For many years, countries which have had started earlier in decentralizing crime prevention were embroiled in the crime displacement debate. The critics of crime prevention and community safety allege that efforts to curb crime do not result to net gains for society because the spatial displacement of the perpetrators of crime offset any crime prevention gains. Furthermore, proponents of crime displacement, argue that the resources poured into crime prevention and the associated opportunity costs all go to waste. In the context of Little Baguio, the criminals discouraged by the higher risks may only transfer to the less prepared communities bordering Little Baguio along Santolan Rd., P. Guevarra Street and Wilson Street, or even miles away from Little Baguio. Unfortunately, crime displacement is an intuitively plausible argument.
Furthermore, crime prevention efforts like patrol system largely affect the situation-side and not the offender-side, thus, the pool of willing criminals are not directly thwarted. In many instances, the crime displacement argument has encouraged inaction and passivity. Furthermore, areas which do not have the resources to buttress their crime prevention efforts resent it when criminals are displaces to their territory due to the successful crime prevention efforts of more capable areas.
If Little Baguio’s stakeholders encounter this argument, they must be aware that crime displacement has already been discredited. In 1994, Hessling’s empirical work conclude that crime displacement is “possible, but not an inevitable consequence of crime prevention. Further, if displacement does occur, it will be in limited size and scope.” It must be clear that Little Baguio’s stakeholders must learn from the documented community prevention efforts which were hampered because of the passivity and inaction forwarded by the crime displacement.
Obsolescence.
Indeed, while our field work has shown the considerable vigor of the current leadership to improve patrols, literature has also documented the resilience of offenders in adapting to the new crime prevention schemes. Gloria Laycock and Barry Webb contend that there is evidence that problems usually return after a lull because offenders uncover the real risks of being apprehended (it may actually lower than first thought), and find ways to circumvent the deterrents. Given the knowledge of patrol systems presented in the previous part, a creative and determined criminal will not find it exceedingly hard to breach Little Baguio’s Patrols and victimize its affluent residents. For example, in stealing water meters, thieves can post mobile watchmen while their partners steal water meters as long as the coast is clear of any patrols.
Furthermore, if the streets pose higher risks of being caught, why not do crime inside the houses when their owners are at work and only gullible maids are home? In fact, Chairman Silvano recounted a recent similar incident where a thief pretended to be the home owner’s relative. The maid let him in and he consequently robbed an item.
Community leaders must calibrate their expectations to the reality that success may be in the short-term. Public perception must also be conditioned to the realistic expectation of a patrol’s performance; so that the when crimes suddenly spike after the initial success, the reputation of the barangay leadership and the patrol itself are cushioned from disproportionate criticism. Public perception can be influenced by holding meaningful and regular dialogues or consultation – like the ones Chairman Silvano has already began. These regular dialogues must also be used to inform the community of the changing “techniques” and modus operandi of the criminals.
Complacency.
While obsolescence highlights the cunning of the criminals, complacency describes the crime preventers’ gradual fading of vigilance after a surge of success. According to Hill and Pease, “Decreasing crime rates yield transitory praise followed by conviction that there is no longer a problem, all too often followed by a resurgence of crime.” Again, this is a warning that initial success may not be for long.
Little Baguio’s stakeholders must guard against complacency because this is less acceptable than obsolescence, which is offender-related. It is unthinkable to tell the community that crimes are rising again due to the patrol’s complacency. The worst case scenario is when obsolescence and complacency coincide, which is likely because complacency exposes the system to obsolescence. Perhaps a concrete measure to guard against complacency is to explicitly instruct the patrol teams to investigate the new techniques of the criminals. These learnings must be included in the mandatory written reports of the patrol teams. Learning firsthand of the new activities of criminals and the possible obsolescence of the current patrol system may jolt the patrol from complacency. The information on recent criminal activities gathered by patrols can then be shared to community during dialogues or consultations.
Sustainability.
The literature admonishes us that many crime prevention efforts –both successful and unsuccessful- have neglected the sustainability of their efforts. Patrol sustainability may be elaborated along the conceptual framework’s five success-factors: sustainability in best leadership practices, equipment, training, consultation, funding. Just to illustrate, let us revisit familiar questions like: what is the equipment’s period of usefulness? What can be done to decrease the rate of equipment depreciation? What can be done to retain the pool of trained and experienced patrollers? Or at the very least, what can be done to preserve their expertise?
These patrollers might be lured by other work opportunities, or may leave the patrol when the barangay leadership is changed. How will funding be sustained when the cost of crime prevention is likely to rise? When greater effort is demanded from patrollers who have to cope with the evolving face of crime, these patrollers may demand greater compensation. In Little Baguio, Chairman Silvano’s wide connections and placement in society has allowed the barangay to obtain free equipment and other sources of funding. What if the next chairman is not as well connected? Where will they get spontaneous sources of funding which has proven to be instrumental in the reformed patrol efforts?
The more pressing issue is in what will be done when the set of leaders are replaced. The policies and disposition of the new leadership may be inconsistent with that of the former leadership. What mechanisms are in place to sustain the patrol system’s quality? From the old barangay chairman to the new, and from the old patrollers to the new, there must be a transmission of knowledge, and a congruence of values. Without these, it is hard to imagine sustainable successful patrol efforts.
Surely, Little Baguio’s current practice of including an experienced kagawad in each patrol team is in the direction of sustainability. But Chairman Silvano must also make sure that when his term ends (if he is replaced or if he finishes the limit of three consecutive terms) there is a transmission of knowledge from the old council to the new. Furthermore, Chairman Silvano must compel the new council to conform to the values which have made the patrol system better than how he found it. From these, we can see the importance of properly documented, easily accessible written reports or records regarding the goings-one in the barangay, especially those that concern crime prevention, crime statistics, regular patrol reports, new criminal activity updates etc… When knowledge and values are encoded on paper, sustainability is enhanced.
However, accumulating quantities of written knowledge is not enough; it has been observed that quality and relevance of sustainability-oriented knowledge must also be given attention. Literature warns that stakeholders tend to meet in planning and meeting alone and devote little time to up-skilling, reflecting and updating. Clearly,
Lastly, though it may impinge on the current chairman’s personal prerogatives (we don’t know the politics between the incumbent and the successor), it may be for the barangay’s best interest if he introduce his successor to his generous connections. This will increase the probability of the barangay sustaining its spontaneous sources of financing.
Secondly, leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime. The inclusion of these variables in before mid 2008 noticeably changed the crime rates. The data does not reject this hypothesis but does not offer comprehensive results. The analysis has suggested the links between these variables and their effects on crime. At this point, there is sufficient reason to believe that in the Philippine’s context, these five success variables have a palpable effect on crime prevention just like the claims of the literature. However, a more satisifying elucidation will require data on crime rates of more years.
Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous assessment. Again the success in the mid-90’s and the spike of crimes in the years leading to 2007 confirm that there is a possibility for a reversal. The causes of these reversals are multitude. And if ever the current promising patrol reforms bloom into a period of security similar to the mid-90’s, the causes of the reformed patrol’s reversal into ineffectiveness remain to be seen – if ever such a reversal will occur notwithstanding the literature and this case study’s agreement that it is likely to occur. The following section gives an account of the literature’s analysis on these prospects.
Warnings: Future Vulnerabilities, Anticipated Possibilities
The vibrant community safety literature we have surveyed reveal empirically-compelling findings and documented cases about probable vulnerabilities, and anticipated possibilities usually encountered by crime prevention efforts like patrol systems that have already attained a level of success. While the previous sections give recommendations on how to improve the five identified success-factors of a barangay-level patrol system, this section tackles the probable predicaments the barangay will face when it is already around a certain level of success. Discussing these warnings is crucial in helping the stakeholders increase the patrol system’s anticipatory capacity, policy flexibility, and awareness of its horizons. Clearly, we stand to learn from the experiences distilled in the literature to better maneuver from known faulty policies, and ignorance.
Crime displacement.
Perhaps the most immediately relevant waning to the patrol system is the issue of crime displacement, which is the “alleged tendency of prevented crime to move to other locales.” For many years, countries which have had started earlier in decentralizing crime prevention were embroiled in the crime displacement debate. The critics of crime prevention and community safety allege that efforts to curb crime do not result to net gains for society because the spatial displacement of the perpetrators of crime offset any crime prevention gains. Furthermore, proponents of crime displacement, argue that the resources poured into crime prevention and the associated opportunity costs all go to waste. In the context of Little Baguio, the criminals discouraged by the higher risks may only transfer to the less prepared communities bordering Little Baguio along Santolan Rd., P. Guevarra Street and Wilson Street, or even miles away from Little Baguio. Unfortunately, crime displacement is an intuitively plausible argument.
Furthermore, crime prevention efforts like patrol system largely affect the situation-side and not the offender-side, thus, the pool of willing criminals are not directly thwarted. In many instances, the crime displacement argument has encouraged inaction and passivity. Furthermore, areas which do not have the resources to buttress their crime prevention efforts resent it when criminals are displaces to their territory due to the successful crime prevention efforts of more capable areas.
If Little Baguio’s stakeholders encounter this argument, they must be aware that crime displacement has already been discredited. In 1994, Hessling’s empirical work conclude that crime displacement is “possible, but not an inevitable consequence of crime prevention. Further, if displacement does occur, it will be in limited size and scope.” It must be clear that Little Baguio’s stakeholders must learn from the documented community prevention efforts which were hampered because of the passivity and inaction forwarded by the crime displacement.
Obsolescence.
Indeed, while our field work has shown the considerable vigor of the current leadership to improve patrols, literature has also documented the resilience of offenders in adapting to the new crime prevention schemes. Gloria Laycock and Barry Webb contend that there is evidence that problems usually return after a lull because offenders uncover the real risks of being apprehended (it may actually lower than first thought), and find ways to circumvent the deterrents. Given the knowledge of patrol systems presented in the previous part, a creative and determined criminal will not find it exceedingly hard to breach Little Baguio’s Patrols and victimize its affluent residents. For example, in stealing water meters, thieves can post mobile watchmen while their partners steal water meters as long as the coast is clear of any patrols.
Furthermore, if the streets pose higher risks of being caught, why not do crime inside the houses when their owners are at work and only gullible maids are home? In fact, Chairman Silvano recounted a recent similar incident where a thief pretended to be the home owner’s relative. The maid let him in and he consequently robbed an item.
Community leaders must calibrate their expectations to the reality that success may be in the short-term. Public perception must also be conditioned to the realistic expectation of a patrol’s performance; so that the when crimes suddenly spike after the initial success, the reputation of the barangay leadership and the patrol itself are cushioned from disproportionate criticism. Public perception can be influenced by holding meaningful and regular dialogues or consultation – like the ones Chairman Silvano has already began. These regular dialogues must also be used to inform the community of the changing “techniques” and modus operandi of the criminals.
Complacency.
While obsolescence highlights the cunning of the criminals, complacency describes the crime preventers’ gradual fading of vigilance after a surge of success. According to Hill and Pease, “Decreasing crime rates yield transitory praise followed by conviction that there is no longer a problem, all too often followed by a resurgence of crime.” Again, this is a warning that initial success may not be for long.
Little Baguio’s stakeholders must guard against complacency because this is less acceptable than obsolescence, which is offender-related. It is unthinkable to tell the community that crimes are rising again due to the patrol’s complacency. The worst case scenario is when obsolescence and complacency coincide, which is likely because complacency exposes the system to obsolescence. Perhaps a concrete measure to guard against complacency is to explicitly instruct the patrol teams to investigate the new techniques of the criminals. These learnings must be included in the mandatory written reports of the patrol teams. Learning firsthand of the new activities of criminals and the possible obsolescence of the current patrol system may jolt the patrol from complacency. The information on recent criminal activities gathered by patrols can then be shared to community during dialogues or consultations.
Sustainability.
The literature admonishes us that many crime prevention efforts –both successful and unsuccessful- have neglected the sustainability of their efforts. Patrol sustainability may be elaborated along the conceptual framework’s five success-factors: sustainability in best leadership practices, equipment, training, consultation, funding. Just to illustrate, let us revisit familiar questions like: what is the equipment’s period of usefulness? What can be done to decrease the rate of equipment depreciation? What can be done to retain the pool of trained and experienced patrollers? Or at the very least, what can be done to preserve their expertise?
These patrollers might be lured by other work opportunities, or may leave the patrol when the barangay leadership is changed. How will funding be sustained when the cost of crime prevention is likely to rise? When greater effort is demanded from patrollers who have to cope with the evolving face of crime, these patrollers may demand greater compensation. In Little Baguio, Chairman Silvano’s wide connections and placement in society has allowed the barangay to obtain free equipment and other sources of funding. What if the next chairman is not as well connected? Where will they get spontaneous sources of funding which has proven to be instrumental in the reformed patrol efforts?
The more pressing issue is in what will be done when the set of leaders are replaced. The policies and disposition of the new leadership may be inconsistent with that of the former leadership. What mechanisms are in place to sustain the patrol system’s quality? From the old barangay chairman to the new, and from the old patrollers to the new, there must be a transmission of knowledge, and a congruence of values. Without these, it is hard to imagine sustainable successful patrol efforts.
Surely, Little Baguio’s current practice of including an experienced kagawad in each patrol team is in the direction of sustainability. But Chairman Silvano must also make sure that when his term ends (if he is replaced or if he finishes the limit of three consecutive terms) there is a transmission of knowledge from the old council to the new. Furthermore, Chairman Silvano must compel the new council to conform to the values which have made the patrol system better than how he found it. From these, we can see the importance of properly documented, easily accessible written reports or records regarding the goings-one in the barangay, especially those that concern crime prevention, crime statistics, regular patrol reports, new criminal activity updates etc… When knowledge and values are encoded on paper, sustainability is enhanced.
However, accumulating quantities of written knowledge is not enough; it has been observed that quality and relevance of sustainability-oriented knowledge must also be given attention. Literature warns that stakeholders tend to meet in planning and meeting alone and devote little time to up-skilling, reflecting and updating. Clearly,
Lastly, though it may impinge on the current chairman’s personal prerogatives (we don’t know the politics between the incumbent and the successor), it may be for the barangay’s best interest if he introduce his successor to his generous connections. This will increase the probability of the barangay sustaining its spontaneous sources of financing.
Other Findings on the Effects of the Patrol System
Based on the data and the analysis, it became evident that there is a set of crimes that are responsive to patrol efforts and similarly, a set of crimes that remain impervious to patrol efforts in preventing crime. The more responsive crimes include theft, mischief grave threats, and alarms and scandals. The less responsive crimes are light threats and physical injury. A rough but intuitive conjecture can somehow explain this varying responsiveness of crimes to patrol efforts: the more distant from the road, the more distant from deterrence. This distance is not only spatial but also social. A bedroom where a husband is about to smash his woman’s face may only be a meter away from a sidewalk where a lad is trying to steal a water meter. But since he is enclosed within the walls of a marital bedroom, he is so much distant from patrol deterrence compared to the lad. The observation on responsiveness to crime prevention in the Philippine setting and the issue of “distance from deterrence” may be of interest to other researchers. Perhaps, these may even be the basis of hypothesis of future research endeavors.
Five Success Factors
1. Leadership
An analysis of leadership, which we conjecture as a decisive variable in patrol success, focuses on the Chairman Silvano’s role in the whole process. Chairman Silvano is a graduate of the Ateneo and is currently teaching in Xavier. Needless to say, he is educated and very well connected. His connections enabled the barangay to acquire equipment that it might not be able to afford otherwise. Chairman Silvano had repeatedly been able to muster the financial support of his connections in Xavier.
The leadership style of Chaiman Silvano has also proven beneficial to the crime prevention efforts. His commitment to a democratic and participative management of the barangay manifested in his quick move to establish links with the very residents through consultation. That the previous barangay council did not do the same laborious consultation method of Chairman Silvano articulates the dynamism the young new chairman seems to have injected into the barangay council. It is evident that even the historicity of the leader has a palpable impact on the over-all direction of crime prevention efforts. A leader’s dispositions, personality, leadership style, stature in society, even his network of connections are all crucial to establish a direction that promotes – a direction that stakeholders will support.
However, leadership’s value to patrol efforts does not only include Chairman Silvano but also the head of the peace and order group, his brother Kagawad Ricky. These writers believe that the familial ties between chairman and Peace and Order Head are also worthy of analysis. Even in organizations with dynamic leaders, frictions with other pertinent officials frustrate reform initiatives. Since the two are brothers and have been observed by these writers to have an excellent working relationship within the barangay, Chairman Silvano’s ideas are almost guaranteed support from below. Furthermore, these writers believe that the ties between the two allow open discussion of ideas; when Chairman Silvano proposes a patrol-related undertaking before the council, the proposal is already a product of the discussions the two brothers and the inputs from the experience of the entire patrol system of which Kagawad Ricky is head. Hence Chairman Silvano’s proposal can be implemented with fewer squabbles – especially not from Kagawad Ricky. If this is not yet the case (which s unlikely), then the brothers would be well advised to exploit this opportunity to make proposals which will quickly get everyone’s approval.
During the interview with Kagawad Ricky, he smilingly quipped that while the previous council had enough dissenting voices to retard productive activities, the current council gets along very well. At this point, it is clear that while individual leaders influence the direction of projects like a patrol system, the weight of a whole bureaucracy in an organization may steer it to different directions.
Conversely, while the familial relationship between chairman and patrol head cannot be translated in other contexts, it must noted that what we are describing as beneficial to the patrol effort is a smooth and orderly leadership structure where there is excellent working relations from above and below the organizational chart; leaders are open to the input of his subordinates while subordinates are more inclined to support the leaders’ proposals or constructively improve them.
2. Consultation
Indeed, just like what the literature says, consultation is crucial because it allows the stakeholders to air concerns and extract commitment from the community leaders. Likewise, community leaders benefit because their initiatives gain legitimacy, and support from the people – whether the support be expressed implicitly through respect or explicitly through material donations, or other tangible contributions. But the experience in Little Baguio also reveals that the manner of consultation also plays a part in jolting the stakeholders into action. In fact, it seems that the more unprecedented the manner of consultation, the more the stakeholders are jolted into participation.
Almost right after from assuming office, Chairman Silvano took upon himself the unprecedented and laborious task of consulting with the stakeholders in each area or street in the whole territory of Little Baguio which took 20 days to complete. It must have entailed some sacrifices because he also taught (and still teaches) at Xavier. Past consultations involved inviting residents to assemble in a designated place. Chairman Silvano noted that a disappointing number attended and many just sent their underlings to these assemblies – thus the voices of a crucial stratum of stakeholders were not heard in the conventional consultation. Going to where they live surely circumvented this problem.
The very act of going to their places was an instrument of spreading goodwill. It was the newly installed Chairman’s way of saying that the barangay is under a young, yet competent, caring and dedicated leader. It amplified to the community that they are involved in their own community’ safety. As mentioned, consultation gave the barangay access to the willingness of stakeholders to share their resources for the common good of the barangay. The barangay received donations, solicited more money, and got more pledges. Perhaps, another important contribution of consultation (not frequently encountered in the literature, if at all) is its power to consciously or unconsciously transmit to the community the values of proactive participation and altruism.
As a final note on how to improve consultation process, Chairman Silvano and the stakeholders must be consciously aware that the “Visitation” consultation method is an opportunity to transmit values. It is a precedent which can hopefully establish the template of any barangay initiative in the future. Thus, it may be helpful to institutionalize such consultation method into a regular yearly undertaking. The usual assembly consultation can serve as a supplement to the more emotive Visitation consultation.
3. Funding
The analysis of funding is simple: the barangay’s internal source of funding is inadequate but the nonetheless, the barangay still acquired enough resources to procure equipment and manpower which are important to patrol reforms. Again, the importance of leadership surfaces. Spontaneous sources of funding from connections and stakeholders who were tapped during the consultation augmented the insufficient financial might of the barangay. Because of the rescue provided by donations, the barangay had been able to bolster the assets of the patrol and consequently help in preventing crime.
How can the financial situation be improved?
Clearly, the barangay must not neglect its own coffers. To increase revenue allocation by increasing the number of registered population, the barangay must take concrete measures to ensure that a more accurate population figure is registered at the National Statistics Office. One such step is to inform the all the stakeholders of the dates the NSO personnel will make rounds in the area and enjoin them to participate because the barangay deserves a bigger IRA. The barangay can also mobilize stakeholders to accompany NSO personnel so that they are more able to access the dwellings of the hesitant (or perhaps diffident) middle class, and the denizens of high-rise residential towers, or apartments. In this undertaking, the barangay can request for volunteers, relegate it to the available tanods, or invite civic-minded Xavier students, orgs, or students of civic-related classes to accompany NSO personnel.
4. Manpower-Training
Firstly, the increase in manpower from 6 to 15 tanods substantially improved the range and capacity of the system. If the directives are followed strictly, there are 4 tanods on the field at any given moment. The series of training of the current patrol tanods also improved the reliability of tanods in crime prevention and somehow gave them slivers of skill to intervene with crime as it happens. The barangay is also more confident to field trained tanods.
Our research does not reveal any formal continuity in the training once they were completed. So the recourse is to hope that there are reinforcement mechanisms that enable them to retain or even sharpen their learning in the four areas of training. However, these writers believe that the benefits of the first aid training and police training (this included bomb detection etc…), may quickly fade because there seems to be few opportunities to reinforce those learned skills. The same could not be said of the traffic management training and some legal aspects because tanods continually engage in traffic management and logbook keeping. Also, the addition of manpower in the form of a dedicated VAWC desk appears to do little in preventing crime. In 2007, there were only 17 reported cases of physical abuse while in January to October of 2008, there were already 23 reported cases of physical abuse. With the reasonable assumption that physical abuse is the usual form of violence against women and children, then we can say that the VAWC has not been able to deter violence against women and children.
Clearly, manpower-training has to be refined.
Firstly, there must be a continuous reinforcement of learned skills either through scheduled seminars/demonstrations, through patrol meetings devoted to sharing of experiences, updating, reflecting, or through active mentorship among the patrol teams.
It seems that the series of four trainings happened due somehow to circumstances external to the Little Baguio’s barangay council. For example, UP Law provided legal training, tanods underwent training at TMPO upon the encouragement of the City of San Juan’s directive, etc… So secondly, the barangay (if it has not yet done so) must institute or formalize a training procedure for its tanods and not rely on what training is offered, encouraged or available in the external environment. Rather, after crafting a sort of feasible “curriculum”, the barangay must seek from the environment the expertise required to fulfill the “curriculum”, if ever the expertise cannot be found within the curriculum. It is possible that the teaching experience of Chairman Silvano be useful in formulating an effective learning process for the tanods.
Thirdly, the barangay must ponder on including combat skills in the training of tanods. Tanods are given sticks, wooden blocks etc… as weapons, it is only logical that they also be taught systematic ways of wielding those implements. Again, student groups or PE teachers in Xavier (where Chairman Silvano is very well connected) who have relevant knowledge in weapons may be requested to conduct seminars/combat demonstrations to the tanods.
5. Equipment
Aside from the increase in manpower, the major difference in the reformed patrol system is the addition of the Suzuki Multi-cab which was converted into a dedicated patrol vehicle equipped with a blinker. The new patrol vehicle afforded the patrol greater mobility, responsiveness and increased the scope of its crime prevention efforts. The inclusion of blinkers is also commendable and strategic because by imitating police vehicles it greatly increases the visibility of the patrol’s approach. Because of the blinkers, more criminals from locations farther from the multi-cab are made aware of the nearby presence of “law-enforcers”, thus increasing the deterrent quality of the roaming patrol. This also testifies to Ekblom’s typology that that the community patrol is designed not to engage offenders but to manipulate the environment so as to discourage offenders or a disorder event. The blinker-equipped multi-cab also prevents the patrols from having to confront the offenders or criminals because clearly, the tanods themselves are neither enthusiastic nor sufficiently trained and equipped to intervene in the crime.
Though the multi-cab is the center of an analysis in equipment, the usefulness of the uniform must not be underestimated. The presence of a uniformed duo in an area provides a certain level of deterrence against offenders.
Indeed, the patrol system does not have yet the optimal mix and quantity of equipment. Chairman Silvano himself said that two-way radios which can utilize the unused antenna in the Barangay Hall are urgently needed. Purchase of a new motorcycle with side-car is in being planned.
Since the barangay itself knows these areas for improvement, this paper then points to another concern: the depreciation of equipment. Because these assets are investments, it is only proper for the barangay to make these assets last long as possible. The rate of depreciation must be reduced. The barangay must identify its most valued assets and distribute maintenance costs accordingly. For example, because the multi-cab is currently the most valuable, it must command greater maintenance and care from the barangay. Furthermore, the barangay must also identify the uses of each asset and stipulate that it cannot be used for any other reasons.
The handlers, drivers, or users of the assets must also be strictly recorded in a logbook. Not only will these measures protect the assets from overuse and abuse, these will also promote discipline and accountability among barangay personnel.
An analysis of leadership, which we conjecture as a decisive variable in patrol success, focuses on the Chairman Silvano’s role in the whole process. Chairman Silvano is a graduate of the Ateneo and is currently teaching in Xavier. Needless to say, he is educated and very well connected. His connections enabled the barangay to acquire equipment that it might not be able to afford otherwise. Chairman Silvano had repeatedly been able to muster the financial support of his connections in Xavier.
The leadership style of Chaiman Silvano has also proven beneficial to the crime prevention efforts. His commitment to a democratic and participative management of the barangay manifested in his quick move to establish links with the very residents through consultation. That the previous barangay council did not do the same laborious consultation method of Chairman Silvano articulates the dynamism the young new chairman seems to have injected into the barangay council. It is evident that even the historicity of the leader has a palpable impact on the over-all direction of crime prevention efforts. A leader’s dispositions, personality, leadership style, stature in society, even his network of connections are all crucial to establish a direction that promotes – a direction that stakeholders will support.
However, leadership’s value to patrol efforts does not only include Chairman Silvano but also the head of the peace and order group, his brother Kagawad Ricky. These writers believe that the familial ties between chairman and Peace and Order Head are also worthy of analysis. Even in organizations with dynamic leaders, frictions with other pertinent officials frustrate reform initiatives. Since the two are brothers and have been observed by these writers to have an excellent working relationship within the barangay, Chairman Silvano’s ideas are almost guaranteed support from below. Furthermore, these writers believe that the ties between the two allow open discussion of ideas; when Chairman Silvano proposes a patrol-related undertaking before the council, the proposal is already a product of the discussions the two brothers and the inputs from the experience of the entire patrol system of which Kagawad Ricky is head. Hence Chairman Silvano’s proposal can be implemented with fewer squabbles – especially not from Kagawad Ricky. If this is not yet the case (which s unlikely), then the brothers would be well advised to exploit this opportunity to make proposals which will quickly get everyone’s approval.
During the interview with Kagawad Ricky, he smilingly quipped that while the previous council had enough dissenting voices to retard productive activities, the current council gets along very well. At this point, it is clear that while individual leaders influence the direction of projects like a patrol system, the weight of a whole bureaucracy in an organization may steer it to different directions.
Conversely, while the familial relationship between chairman and patrol head cannot be translated in other contexts, it must noted that what we are describing as beneficial to the patrol effort is a smooth and orderly leadership structure where there is excellent working relations from above and below the organizational chart; leaders are open to the input of his subordinates while subordinates are more inclined to support the leaders’ proposals or constructively improve them.
2. Consultation
Indeed, just like what the literature says, consultation is crucial because it allows the stakeholders to air concerns and extract commitment from the community leaders. Likewise, community leaders benefit because their initiatives gain legitimacy, and support from the people – whether the support be expressed implicitly through respect or explicitly through material donations, or other tangible contributions. But the experience in Little Baguio also reveals that the manner of consultation also plays a part in jolting the stakeholders into action. In fact, it seems that the more unprecedented the manner of consultation, the more the stakeholders are jolted into participation.
Almost right after from assuming office, Chairman Silvano took upon himself the unprecedented and laborious task of consulting with the stakeholders in each area or street in the whole territory of Little Baguio which took 20 days to complete. It must have entailed some sacrifices because he also taught (and still teaches) at Xavier. Past consultations involved inviting residents to assemble in a designated place. Chairman Silvano noted that a disappointing number attended and many just sent their underlings to these assemblies – thus the voices of a crucial stratum of stakeholders were not heard in the conventional consultation. Going to where they live surely circumvented this problem.
The very act of going to their places was an instrument of spreading goodwill. It was the newly installed Chairman’s way of saying that the barangay is under a young, yet competent, caring and dedicated leader. It amplified to the community that they are involved in their own community’ safety. As mentioned, consultation gave the barangay access to the willingness of stakeholders to share their resources for the common good of the barangay. The barangay received donations, solicited more money, and got more pledges. Perhaps, another important contribution of consultation (not frequently encountered in the literature, if at all) is its power to consciously or unconsciously transmit to the community the values of proactive participation and altruism.
As a final note on how to improve consultation process, Chairman Silvano and the stakeholders must be consciously aware that the “Visitation” consultation method is an opportunity to transmit values. It is a precedent which can hopefully establish the template of any barangay initiative in the future. Thus, it may be helpful to institutionalize such consultation method into a regular yearly undertaking. The usual assembly consultation can serve as a supplement to the more emotive Visitation consultation.
3. Funding
The analysis of funding is simple: the barangay’s internal source of funding is inadequate but the nonetheless, the barangay still acquired enough resources to procure equipment and manpower which are important to patrol reforms. Again, the importance of leadership surfaces. Spontaneous sources of funding from connections and stakeholders who were tapped during the consultation augmented the insufficient financial might of the barangay. Because of the rescue provided by donations, the barangay had been able to bolster the assets of the patrol and consequently help in preventing crime.
How can the financial situation be improved?
Clearly, the barangay must not neglect its own coffers. To increase revenue allocation by increasing the number of registered population, the barangay must take concrete measures to ensure that a more accurate population figure is registered at the National Statistics Office. One such step is to inform the all the stakeholders of the dates the NSO personnel will make rounds in the area and enjoin them to participate because the barangay deserves a bigger IRA. The barangay can also mobilize stakeholders to accompany NSO personnel so that they are more able to access the dwellings of the hesitant (or perhaps diffident) middle class, and the denizens of high-rise residential towers, or apartments. In this undertaking, the barangay can request for volunteers, relegate it to the available tanods, or invite civic-minded Xavier students, orgs, or students of civic-related classes to accompany NSO personnel.
4. Manpower-Training
Firstly, the increase in manpower from 6 to 15 tanods substantially improved the range and capacity of the system. If the directives are followed strictly, there are 4 tanods on the field at any given moment. The series of training of the current patrol tanods also improved the reliability of tanods in crime prevention and somehow gave them slivers of skill to intervene with crime as it happens. The barangay is also more confident to field trained tanods.
Our research does not reveal any formal continuity in the training once they were completed. So the recourse is to hope that there are reinforcement mechanisms that enable them to retain or even sharpen their learning in the four areas of training. However, these writers believe that the benefits of the first aid training and police training (this included bomb detection etc…), may quickly fade because there seems to be few opportunities to reinforce those learned skills. The same could not be said of the traffic management training and some legal aspects because tanods continually engage in traffic management and logbook keeping. Also, the addition of manpower in the form of a dedicated VAWC desk appears to do little in preventing crime. In 2007, there were only 17 reported cases of physical abuse while in January to October of 2008, there were already 23 reported cases of physical abuse. With the reasonable assumption that physical abuse is the usual form of violence against women and children, then we can say that the VAWC has not been able to deter violence against women and children.
Clearly, manpower-training has to be refined.
Firstly, there must be a continuous reinforcement of learned skills either through scheduled seminars/demonstrations, through patrol meetings devoted to sharing of experiences, updating, reflecting, or through active mentorship among the patrol teams.
It seems that the series of four trainings happened due somehow to circumstances external to the Little Baguio’s barangay council. For example, UP Law provided legal training, tanods underwent training at TMPO upon the encouragement of the City of San Juan’s directive, etc… So secondly, the barangay (if it has not yet done so) must institute or formalize a training procedure for its tanods and not rely on what training is offered, encouraged or available in the external environment. Rather, after crafting a sort of feasible “curriculum”, the barangay must seek from the environment the expertise required to fulfill the “curriculum”, if ever the expertise cannot be found within the curriculum. It is possible that the teaching experience of Chairman Silvano be useful in formulating an effective learning process for the tanods.
Thirdly, the barangay must ponder on including combat skills in the training of tanods. Tanods are given sticks, wooden blocks etc… as weapons, it is only logical that they also be taught systematic ways of wielding those implements. Again, student groups or PE teachers in Xavier (where Chairman Silvano is very well connected) who have relevant knowledge in weapons may be requested to conduct seminars/combat demonstrations to the tanods.
5. Equipment
Aside from the increase in manpower, the major difference in the reformed patrol system is the addition of the Suzuki Multi-cab which was converted into a dedicated patrol vehicle equipped with a blinker. The new patrol vehicle afforded the patrol greater mobility, responsiveness and increased the scope of its crime prevention efforts. The inclusion of blinkers is also commendable and strategic because by imitating police vehicles it greatly increases the visibility of the patrol’s approach. Because of the blinkers, more criminals from locations farther from the multi-cab are made aware of the nearby presence of “law-enforcers”, thus increasing the deterrent quality of the roaming patrol. This also testifies to Ekblom’s typology that that the community patrol is designed not to engage offenders but to manipulate the environment so as to discourage offenders or a disorder event. The blinker-equipped multi-cab also prevents the patrols from having to confront the offenders or criminals because clearly, the tanods themselves are neither enthusiastic nor sufficiently trained and equipped to intervene in the crime.
Though the multi-cab is the center of an analysis in equipment, the usefulness of the uniform must not be underestimated. The presence of a uniformed duo in an area provides a certain level of deterrence against offenders.
Indeed, the patrol system does not have yet the optimal mix and quantity of equipment. Chairman Silvano himself said that two-way radios which can utilize the unused antenna in the Barangay Hall are urgently needed. Purchase of a new motorcycle with side-car is in being planned.
Since the barangay itself knows these areas for improvement, this paper then points to another concern: the depreciation of equipment. Because these assets are investments, it is only proper for the barangay to make these assets last long as possible. The rate of depreciation must be reduced. The barangay must identify its most valued assets and distribute maintenance costs accordingly. For example, because the multi-cab is currently the most valuable, it must command greater maintenance and care from the barangay. Furthermore, the barangay must also identify the uses of each asset and stipulate that it cannot be used for any other reasons.
The handlers, drivers, or users of the assets must also be strictly recorded in a logbook. Not only will these measures protect the assets from overuse and abuse, these will also promote discipline and accountability among barangay personnel.
Analysis of the Efficacy of Little Baguio's Barangay Patrol
The crime rates of 2008 show a decrease in total crime incidences and a considerable decrease of grave crimes like theft. How can these positive results be explained using the variables thought to be crucial to the success of a patrol system as a crime prevention strategy? Included in the discussion of the success factors are the shortcomings and areas for improvement.
Crime During Patrol Implementation
With the implementation of the newly reformed and reorganized or upgraded barangay patrol, one can refer to the 2008 crime index of the barangay in assessing success or failure.
In comparison to the year 2007, there is a small decrease in the total index crimes of the year 2008 excluding the months of November and December. There are certain non-index crimes that weren’t reported in the year 2008 as compared to a high number of cases in 2007, namely reports of Estafa, and violations of R.A. 7610. The reports of Grave Threats as well were significantly decreased from twenty-three (23) cases in the year 2007 to six (6) cases in the year 2008. As well as a decrease in the cases of trespassing from seven (7) cases to five (5) cases reported, the cases of violations of R.A. 9262 from seven (7) reported cases to three (3) and the reports of Alarms and Scandals decreased from five (5) reported cases to one (1) case reported.
What is interesting to note is that, there is an increase in the reported cases of Light Threats, from one (1) reported case of light threats to fourteen cases (14) in the succeeding year and the reported cases of Direct Assault had an increase of one (1) case to (six) reported cases.
In comparison to the year 2007, there is a small decrease in the total index crimes of the year 2008 excluding the months of November and December. There are certain non-index crimes that weren’t reported in the year 2008 as compared to a high number of cases in 2007, namely reports of Estafa, and violations of R.A. 7610. The reports of Grave Threats as well were significantly decreased from twenty-three (23) cases in the year 2007 to six (6) cases in the year 2008. As well as a decrease in the cases of trespassing from seven (7) cases to five (5) cases reported, the cases of violations of R.A. 9262 from seven (7) reported cases to three (3) and the reports of Alarms and Scandals decreased from five (5) reported cases to one (1) case reported.
What is interesting to note is that, there is an increase in the reported cases of Light Threats, from one (1) reported case of light threats to fourteen cases (14) in the succeeding year and the reported cases of Direct Assault had an increase of one (1) case to (six) reported cases.
Future Plans for the Barangay Patrol or Police and Order Unit
Chairman Silvano’s long term plan is for each street to have its own barricade and security personnel guarding the entrance and exit of the street. It is hoped that residents in each street will come at an arrangement to pay the sentries for their services during critical parts of the day. This scheme also lessens the strain on the Barangay treasury by distributing the costs to the stakeholders. With this implementation, the Barangay aims to make Jose Abad Santos the only entrance to the Barangay from ten at night until six in the morning. This long term plan can be summarized as a privatization attempt similar to that in a subdivision.
Funding of the Barangay
Chairman Silvano admitted that Barangay Little Baguio’s budget allocation from the central government is just enough to make ends meet and cannot support patrol reforms that entail significant costs. Unfortunately, most reforms – even mere changes in organization or functions – involve costs. For example, the increase in manpower necessitated more honorarium. Even the creation of three different functions required equipment to allow mobility for the roaming duo and communication among the three five members of the shift. Equipment, if ever they are acquired, are subject to depreciation and maintenance costs. To augment general deterrent capabilities of patrols and bolster their capacity to intervene (even if the police force is more equipped to intervene in crime scenarios), more equipment for apprehending are required. Even the training of patrols includes some costs. Given that the patrol has achieved some of the seemingly financially-problematic improvements, how has it funded those improvements?
Clearly, the barangay budget can only cover the maintenance of a system similar to the previous one and major equipment acquisition is not feasible in the short term. Chairman Silvano’s connections provided the means to acquire equipment. For example, Colonel Tocino provided uniforms to the tanods, making them more visible and recognizable as enforcers of security and order. Congressman donated the Suzuki Multi-cab which was converted to a dedicated patrol vehicle.
Aside from the chairman’s connections, some more subtle resources support the patrol system. The culture in the Barangay Hall seems has evolved into a system which encourages the patrol teams to stay in the service. For example, he barangay hall provides meals for the patrol teams.
Undeniably, the most potent source of funding is the barangay’s internal budget itself. Chairman Silvano expressed regret that Little Baguio cannot get its appropriate internal revenue allocation because a considerable number of people are suspected to be unaccounted in the population census. For example, the “busy” middle class may not bother participating in the census. Furthermore, he speculated that many who live in the high-rise residential towers are not accounted in the census. The inaccurate population count frustrates Chairman Silvano because it is a basis for the allocation of funds from the government. He said that he would consider some steps to allow more accurate population counts in the future.
Clearly, the barangay budget can only cover the maintenance of a system similar to the previous one and major equipment acquisition is not feasible in the short term. Chairman Silvano’s connections provided the means to acquire equipment. For example, Colonel Tocino provided uniforms to the tanods, making them more visible and recognizable as enforcers of security and order. Congressman donated the Suzuki Multi-cab which was converted to a dedicated patrol vehicle.
Aside from the chairman’s connections, some more subtle resources support the patrol system. The culture in the Barangay Hall seems has evolved into a system which encourages the patrol teams to stay in the service. For example, he barangay hall provides meals for the patrol teams.
Undeniably, the most potent source of funding is the barangay’s internal budget itself. Chairman Silvano expressed regret that Little Baguio cannot get its appropriate internal revenue allocation because a considerable number of people are suspected to be unaccounted in the population census. For example, the “busy” middle class may not bother participating in the census. Furthermore, he speculated that many who live in the high-rise residential towers are not accounted in the census. The inaccurate population count frustrates Chairman Silvano because it is a basis for the allocation of funds from the government. He said that he would consider some steps to allow more accurate population counts in the future.
The Reformed Barangay Patrol
Organization and Function of the Barangay Patrol
Chairman Allen Silvano and his brother Kagawad/Peace and Order committee head Ricardo Maraya Silvano, the Organization of the Barangay Patrol, introduced a number of changes in the organization and function of the patrol system. They increased patrollers to fifteen and organized them into three teams with five members. Each team has a daily 8-hour shift.
Each of the five-man teams is assigned to perform three different tasks during the shift. Equipped with the motorcycle with sidecar, two of the five men are stationed as sentries in either 7-brothers in Jose Abad Santos Street, in Grant St. around the rotonda found in General Lim near Xavier school, or in Catterpillar along Jose Abad Santos. These places are strategic for sentry duties because they are the entrances into Little Baguio. The schedule and exact positions of these sentries are randomized to confound offenders. Another two are assigned to patrol using the converted Suzuki Multi-cab. The final member of the team will be assigned in the Barangay Hall to man the Peace and Order Desk. Pursuant of DILG directive, the barangay also created a Violence Against Women’s and Children Desk Action Desk for crimes or cases involving women and children.
Manpower, Recruitment, and Training
As mentioned, the tanods were increased from six to fifteen. The position of Barangay Tanod is open to all citizens of the Barangay but is strictly observed and screened by the Barangay Council. During the screening process, recommendations by former Barangay Tanods are valued but spotless legal barangay and criminal records are a must. Aside from requiring the applicants to have no criminal involvements whatsoever, the barangay also prefers younger applicants over the aged or aging ones. The current Tanod’s are from 18-40 years old.
It is important to note that the Barangay Tanod’s from previous barangay councils were not removed from their positions. In every team, there is at least one veteran tanod. They are seen as instrumental in disseminating knowledge to the newly installed Barangay Tanods.
The training of the tanods in the previous barangay was inferior compared to the training procedure currently in place. The members of the current patrol had gone through four phases of training. These are: 1.) Traffic Management; 2.) First-Aid Training; 3.) Police Training; and finally 4.) Legal Aspects.
Traffic Management
Initially a project of the City of San Juan, it has become standard practice for each Barangay Tanod to go undergo training from Traffic, Parking and Mangagement Office (TPMO). An exam must be successfully hurdled before the tanod can be officially deputized. Once deputized, TPMO gives them an Ordinance Violations Receipt (OVR) which allows them to issue tickets at violators of Traffic rules and regulations. Among the Barangays in San Juan City, Barangay Little Baguio has the most number of Barangay Tanod’s passers in the deputization exam of TPMO. Thirteen out of the fifteen Barangay Tanod’s were deputized by TPMO. TPMO training which includes traffic management analysis is essential in arbitrating traffic disputes and the like.
First-Aid Training
All tanods were given first aid training in order to enable them to respond more effectively to emergencies which may require first aid.
Police Special Training The police authorities in San Juan gave lectures on several relevant topics like bomb detection, analysis of traffic management, as crime recording procedures, just to mention a few.
Legal Aspects
The current batch of patrol tanods benefitted from the legal training conducted by University of the Philippines, College of Law in cooperation with San Juan National High School at the latter part of the year of 2008. The training consisted of the basic knowledge on the legally accepted ways of apprehension, proper operations and actions, especially Republic Act 9344 which concerns “children in conflict with the law.” Also, by including veteran tanods in each team, their experiences in situations with legal repercussions are transferred towards the newly hired Barangay Tanods.
Equipment
A citizen of the Barangay appointed as Barangay Security Consultant, Colonel Samson Tocino donated two sets of uniforms from the polo to the shoes of each Barangay Tanod. The patrol force owns five guard sticks (batuta) equipped with tear gas ejectors at the end of each stick and all members are given standard guard sticks as weapons and multi-purpose tools.
Congressman Zamora donated a Suzuki-Multi cab which was converted to a patrol car exclusively for the use of the Barangay Patrol. Included in this conversion is the inclusion of sirens and lights similar to police cars which allow the Barangay to exude a sense of security at night as a warning or to scare criminals in the area. A bike used by the earlier tanods in encircling the barangay is still maintained and used as well as one motorcycle with a side car.
For communication, the barangay patrol has used personal cellphones with the credits of these cellphones beng subsidized by the barangay council. But since it cannot be assured that the subsidized credits are used for patrol-related concerns, Bgy. Chairman Silvano intends to transform the communication equipment of the barangay from cellphones towards two-way radios or walkie-talkies. Considering that the barangay hall itself has aUHF antennae that was registered from the creation of the barangay itself, they intend to use this antennae to be able to maintain a radio channel for communication within the barangay. This is less costly but more effective. If a tanod does not have credits in his cellphone then he cannot contact the rest of the tanods in case of an emergency as compared to the walkie-talkies or two-way radios which will only cost the barangay the initial payment for the units, and marginal maintenance costs but guarantee immediate communication.
To augment the patrol system’s assets, the barangay is saving for a new multi-cab in 2009.
Chairman Allen Silvano and his brother Kagawad/Peace and Order committee head Ricardo Maraya Silvano, the Organization of the Barangay Patrol, introduced a number of changes in the organization and function of the patrol system. They increased patrollers to fifteen and organized them into three teams with five members. Each team has a daily 8-hour shift.
Each of the five-man teams is assigned to perform three different tasks during the shift. Equipped with the motorcycle with sidecar, two of the five men are stationed as sentries in either 7-brothers in Jose Abad Santos Street, in Grant St. around the rotonda found in General Lim near Xavier school, or in Catterpillar along Jose Abad Santos. These places are strategic for sentry duties because they are the entrances into Little Baguio. The schedule and exact positions of these sentries are randomized to confound offenders. Another two are assigned to patrol using the converted Suzuki Multi-cab. The final member of the team will be assigned in the Barangay Hall to man the Peace and Order Desk. Pursuant of DILG directive, the barangay also created a Violence Against Women’s and Children Desk Action Desk for crimes or cases involving women and children.
Manpower, Recruitment, and Training
As mentioned, the tanods were increased from six to fifteen. The position of Barangay Tanod is open to all citizens of the Barangay but is strictly observed and screened by the Barangay Council. During the screening process, recommendations by former Barangay Tanods are valued but spotless legal barangay and criminal records are a must. Aside from requiring the applicants to have no criminal involvements whatsoever, the barangay also prefers younger applicants over the aged or aging ones. The current Tanod’s are from 18-40 years old.
It is important to note that the Barangay Tanod’s from previous barangay councils were not removed from their positions. In every team, there is at least one veteran tanod. They are seen as instrumental in disseminating knowledge to the newly installed Barangay Tanods.
The training of the tanods in the previous barangay was inferior compared to the training procedure currently in place. The members of the current patrol had gone through four phases of training. These are: 1.) Traffic Management; 2.) First-Aid Training; 3.) Police Training; and finally 4.) Legal Aspects.
Traffic Management
Initially a project of the City of San Juan, it has become standard practice for each Barangay Tanod to go undergo training from Traffic, Parking and Mangagement Office (TPMO). An exam must be successfully hurdled before the tanod can be officially deputized. Once deputized, TPMO gives them an Ordinance Violations Receipt (OVR) which allows them to issue tickets at violators of Traffic rules and regulations. Among the Barangays in San Juan City, Barangay Little Baguio has the most number of Barangay Tanod’s passers in the deputization exam of TPMO. Thirteen out of the fifteen Barangay Tanod’s were deputized by TPMO. TPMO training which includes traffic management analysis is essential in arbitrating traffic disputes and the like.
First-Aid Training
All tanods were given first aid training in order to enable them to respond more effectively to emergencies which may require first aid.
Police Special Training The police authorities in San Juan gave lectures on several relevant topics like bomb detection, analysis of traffic management, as crime recording procedures, just to mention a few.
Legal Aspects
The current batch of patrol tanods benefitted from the legal training conducted by University of the Philippines, College of Law in cooperation with San Juan National High School at the latter part of the year of 2008. The training consisted of the basic knowledge on the legally accepted ways of apprehension, proper operations and actions, especially Republic Act 9344 which concerns “children in conflict with the law.” Also, by including veteran tanods in each team, their experiences in situations with legal repercussions are transferred towards the newly hired Barangay Tanods.
Equipment
A citizen of the Barangay appointed as Barangay Security Consultant, Colonel Samson Tocino donated two sets of uniforms from the polo to the shoes of each Barangay Tanod. The patrol force owns five guard sticks (batuta) equipped with tear gas ejectors at the end of each stick and all members are given standard guard sticks as weapons and multi-purpose tools.
Congressman Zamora donated a Suzuki-Multi cab which was converted to a patrol car exclusively for the use of the Barangay Patrol. Included in this conversion is the inclusion of sirens and lights similar to police cars which allow the Barangay to exude a sense of security at night as a warning or to scare criminals in the area. A bike used by the earlier tanods in encircling the barangay is still maintained and used as well as one motorcycle with a side car.
For communication, the barangay patrol has used personal cellphones with the credits of these cellphones beng subsidized by the barangay council. But since it cannot be assured that the subsidized credits are used for patrol-related concerns, Bgy. Chairman Silvano intends to transform the communication equipment of the barangay from cellphones towards two-way radios or walkie-talkies. Considering that the barangay hall itself has aUHF antennae that was registered from the creation of the barangay itself, they intend to use this antennae to be able to maintain a radio channel for communication within the barangay. This is less costly but more effective. If a tanod does not have credits in his cellphone then he cannot contact the rest of the tanods in case of an emergency as compared to the walkie-talkies or two-way radios which will only cost the barangay the initial payment for the units, and marginal maintenance costs but guarantee immediate communication.
To augment the patrol system’s assets, the barangay is saving for a new multi-cab in 2009.
Reformation of the Barangay Patrol
Consultation-driven Reformation
When Chairman Allen Christopher M. Silvano filled the position on December 2007, he intended to involve the community’s inputs in improving the barangay council’s performance. Just shortly after assuming office, Brgy. Chairman Silvano initiated a dialogue with the residents of the barangay to assess area-specific problems, invite input from community members, set expectations, strengthen goodwill, and announce commitments to solve problems. Eschewing the usual manner of gathering the community in an assembly, he himself visited the areas in Little Baguio. In many cases, he did the consultations per street, if an area-wide consultation would dilute the more specific concerns of the residents. It took 20 “exhausting” days for Chairman Silvano to complete this assiduous consultation method. Through this project, Chairman Silvano found out that the barangay experienced three main problems: health-related concerns, traffic management, and the security and order.
Spurred by the community’s feedback and the noticeable rise of crime, Chairman Silvano sought to reform the barangay patrol which is the barangay’s main instrument for community safety. The Barangay Patrol used to be manned by only six barangay tanod’s/patrollers. With only a motorcycle with side car as the motorized patrol vehicle, the six patrollers had to look out for Little Baguio’s 43.7156 has of land. As elaborated in the following sections, there were also many inadequacies in training, equipment, funding.
When Chairman Allen Christopher M. Silvano filled the position on December 2007, he intended to involve the community’s inputs in improving the barangay council’s performance. Just shortly after assuming office, Brgy. Chairman Silvano initiated a dialogue with the residents of the barangay to assess area-specific problems, invite input from community members, set expectations, strengthen goodwill, and announce commitments to solve problems. Eschewing the usual manner of gathering the community in an assembly, he himself visited the areas in Little Baguio. In many cases, he did the consultations per street, if an area-wide consultation would dilute the more specific concerns of the residents. It took 20 “exhausting” days for Chairman Silvano to complete this assiduous consultation method. Through this project, Chairman Silvano found out that the barangay experienced three main problems: health-related concerns, traffic management, and the security and order.
Spurred by the community’s feedback and the noticeable rise of crime, Chairman Silvano sought to reform the barangay patrol which is the barangay’s main instrument for community safety. The Barangay Patrol used to be manned by only six barangay tanod’s/patrollers. With only a motorcycle with side car as the motorized patrol vehicle, the six patrollers had to look out for Little Baguio’s 43.7156 has of land. As elaborated in the following sections, there were also many inadequacies in training, equipment, funding.
Problems in Rising Crimes in the Barangay
In the years 1995-1998 Barangay Little Baguio was voted one of the three most peaceful barangays in San Juan City. This was achieved by the barangay’s close coordination with the San Juan Police Department concerning the activities of drug pushers and users. This was followed by the close association of the community in diverting the youth from drugs and the like through activities such as inter-Barangay Basketball and local competitions, as well as close ties with the parents in the supervision of the children of the barangay. The barangay was also enjoined to report the presence of suspicious characters in the area.
However, there had been an increase in crimes from the years 1999-2007 as compared to the years when the barangay was voted as one of the most peaceful barangays of San Juan. An accompanying trend to this rise in crime was the rapid commercialization during the 90’s in the San Juan area. For example, certain bars and drinking places were established like Moksha, Bella’s, and Jack’s loft, that are found either in the entrances of the barangay or at its limits. As commercialization and enterprises increased, traffic in both commercial and private roads also began to intensify in the area of San Juan.
According to barangay records, there was a spike in certain grievous crimes such as stealing from houses (trespassing and theft) shortly before and during 2007. It is also noted that in some instances, the Barangay Tanods/patrollers were at risk because of the appearance of armed men harassing cars and stores in the neighborhood. Barangay Chairman Silvano recounted one such incident when he was the head of the Peace and Order unit. While they were patrolling at night, they found several suspicious men in the street of V. Ibañez, attempting to open up a car. When the then Peace and Order head officer Allen Silvano interrupted them by asking “if they needed any help”, a third man wielding an armalite brusquely came out of a car waiting nearby. Upon seeing the armed man, the barangay tanods chose to withdraw since they only had a guard stick and a piece of 2x4 wood for each tanod. They promptly alerted the nearest police station about the incident. According to Chairman Silvano, it was the appropriate response because dealing with heavily armed men is not within the capacity of a barangay-level patrol; rather, such cases must be quickly referred to police authorities. Furthermore, Chairman Silvano acknowledged that it is too much to ask from barangay patrollers to risk their lives – and consequently, the subsistence of their respective families – by confronting dangerous situations which are way beyond their intended capacities. This acknowledgement confirms the surveyed literature’s claims (like Ekblom’s typology) that patrol efforts are largely designed to prevent/pre-empt crime before they happen and not to intervene in crime as they happen. Other grievous cases that were reported by individuals in the community were the cases of “Akyat Bahay”, or the trespass of individuals into the properties of the residents and the consequent theft of valuables.
The most prominent cases of theft were the stealing of cables and water meters in the barangay. This was a difficult problem since most of the cases that the perpetrator was caught, showed that these perpetrators were in fact children, or those below the legal age. The far-reaching effects of these thefts are already presented in the introduction of this paper. Needless to say, the theft of cables and water meters was not only an undeniable blemish on the security record of Little Baguio but also a city-wide problem which received widespread attention, and involved disruption of normal life. In fact, Chairman Silvano repeatedly mentioned these thefts as targets of his reform efforts.
The crime index of the year 2007 shows a crime volume of 178 which consisted of 92 index crimes and 86 non-index crimes. Index crimes are the more serious forms of crimes which include murder, homicide, physical injury, robbery, bank robbery, hijacking/highway robbery, theft and rape. In the 2007 index crimes, reports of physical injury numbered a total of 17 cases. Theft numbered a total of 75 cases for the year with a clear prevalence of cases reported in June and at the latter end of the year, namely November. Water meter and cable thefts are included in the “theft” category.
Of the 36 non-index crimes listed in the barangay classifications, these 26 non-index crimes were not reported in 2007:
Illegal Drugs
Illegal Gambling
Loose/Illegal Possession of Firearms
Violation of Municipal Ord. #24 of 1997
Carnapping
Illegal Fishing
Illegal Logging
Cattle Rustling
Other Light Threats
Unjust Vexation
Concealing True Name
Vagrancy
Falsification of Public Document
R.A. 9239 (Optical Media Act of 2003)
B.P. 22 (The Anti-bouncing Check Law)
Attempted homicide
Swindling
Coercion
Violation of R.A. 7832 (Anti-Electricity Pilferage Law)
Acts of Lasciviousness
Violation of R.A. 8484 (Illegal Possession of Access Service)
Usurpation of Authority
Obstruction of Justice
B.P. 6 (Illegal Possession of Bladed, Pointed, Blunt Weapons)
Violation of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 23 Series of 999
Slight Illegal Detention
Thought there were no reports on these 26 non-index crimes, this does not mean that these never happened in 2007. It must be noted that these figures only represent the reported cases and may not account for all the actual crimes within the barangay. The disparity between the reported and actual number of crimes may be due to the lack of convenient opportunities for the reporting of crimes, the unwillingness of victims to hurdle the opportunity cost of bothering to report, or perhaps, due to the offenders’ use of coercive means to deter the reporting of crimes.
However, there had been an increase in crimes from the years 1999-2007 as compared to the years when the barangay was voted as one of the most peaceful barangays of San Juan. An accompanying trend to this rise in crime was the rapid commercialization during the 90’s in the San Juan area. For example, certain bars and drinking places were established like Moksha, Bella’s, and Jack’s loft, that are found either in the entrances of the barangay or at its limits. As commercialization and enterprises increased, traffic in both commercial and private roads also began to intensify in the area of San Juan.
According to barangay records, there was a spike in certain grievous crimes such as stealing from houses (trespassing and theft) shortly before and during 2007. It is also noted that in some instances, the Barangay Tanods/patrollers were at risk because of the appearance of armed men harassing cars and stores in the neighborhood. Barangay Chairman Silvano recounted one such incident when he was the head of the Peace and Order unit. While they were patrolling at night, they found several suspicious men in the street of V. Ibañez, attempting to open up a car. When the then Peace and Order head officer Allen Silvano interrupted them by asking “if they needed any help”, a third man wielding an armalite brusquely came out of a car waiting nearby. Upon seeing the armed man, the barangay tanods chose to withdraw since they only had a guard stick and a piece of 2x4 wood for each tanod. They promptly alerted the nearest police station about the incident. According to Chairman Silvano, it was the appropriate response because dealing with heavily armed men is not within the capacity of a barangay-level patrol; rather, such cases must be quickly referred to police authorities. Furthermore, Chairman Silvano acknowledged that it is too much to ask from barangay patrollers to risk their lives – and consequently, the subsistence of their respective families – by confronting dangerous situations which are way beyond their intended capacities. This acknowledgement confirms the surveyed literature’s claims (like Ekblom’s typology) that patrol efforts are largely designed to prevent/pre-empt crime before they happen and not to intervene in crime as they happen. Other grievous cases that were reported by individuals in the community were the cases of “Akyat Bahay”, or the trespass of individuals into the properties of the residents and the consequent theft of valuables.
The most prominent cases of theft were the stealing of cables and water meters in the barangay. This was a difficult problem since most of the cases that the perpetrator was caught, showed that these perpetrators were in fact children, or those below the legal age. The far-reaching effects of these thefts are already presented in the introduction of this paper. Needless to say, the theft of cables and water meters was not only an undeniable blemish on the security record of Little Baguio but also a city-wide problem which received widespread attention, and involved disruption of normal life. In fact, Chairman Silvano repeatedly mentioned these thefts as targets of his reform efforts.
The crime index of the year 2007 shows a crime volume of 178 which consisted of 92 index crimes and 86 non-index crimes. Index crimes are the more serious forms of crimes which include murder, homicide, physical injury, robbery, bank robbery, hijacking/highway robbery, theft and rape. In the 2007 index crimes, reports of physical injury numbered a total of 17 cases. Theft numbered a total of 75 cases for the year with a clear prevalence of cases reported in June and at the latter end of the year, namely November. Water meter and cable thefts are included in the “theft” category.
Of the 36 non-index crimes listed in the barangay classifications, these 26 non-index crimes were not reported in 2007:
Illegal Drugs
Illegal Gambling
Loose/Illegal Possession of Firearms
Violation of Municipal Ord. #24 of 1997
Carnapping
Illegal Fishing
Illegal Logging
Cattle Rustling
Other Light Threats
Unjust Vexation
Concealing True Name
Vagrancy
Falsification of Public Document
R.A. 9239 (Optical Media Act of 2003)
B.P. 22 (The Anti-bouncing Check Law)
Attempted homicide
Swindling
Coercion
Violation of R.A. 7832 (Anti-Electricity Pilferage Law)
Acts of Lasciviousness
Violation of R.A. 8484 (Illegal Possession of Access Service)
Usurpation of Authority
Obstruction of Justice
B.P. 6 (Illegal Possession of Bladed, Pointed, Blunt Weapons)
Violation of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 23 Series of 999
Slight Illegal Detention
Thought there were no reports on these 26 non-index crimes, this does not mean that these never happened in 2007. It must be noted that these figures only represent the reported cases and may not account for all the actual crimes within the barangay. The disparity between the reported and actual number of crimes may be due to the lack of convenient opportunities for the reporting of crimes, the unwillingness of victims to hurdle the opportunity cost of bothering to report, or perhaps, due to the offenders’ use of coercive means to deter the reporting of crimes.
Barangay Little Baguio: A Detailed Description
Location
Geographically located in the 2nd district of San Juan City, with an area of 43.7156 has (hectares), Barangay Little Baguio used to be the Sta. Lucia Subdivision owned by Madrigal Ortigas y Compania. The land consisted mostly of rice paddies, bamboo groves and fruit trees. Sold in 1946, this land became the Barangay we know today. The name Sta. Lucia Subdivision did not gain acceptance from the members of the community back then. Due to the area’s noticeable elevation which is at 240 feet above sea-level and characterized by zigzag roads similar to its namesake Baguio, the community changed the name to Barangay Little Baguio.
Originally planned as a residential subdivision, Barangay Little Baguio now consists of a few industrial firms and small businesses segregated throughout the area. The existence of two major Christian exclusive schools, namely Xavier School (formerly Kwang Chi School) and the Immaculate Conception Academy (ICA), and Mary the Queen Parish Church has significantly contributed to the accelerated development of the Barangay.
Currently Barangay Little Baguio has, approximately, a population of 6,221. In the San Juan records, as of 2007-2008, Barangay Little Baguio has a population of 5,484. The difference between the local tally and the national census is due to the non-participation of some citizens in the census.
The Barangay’s population ranges from social classes A to E. In turn, there are a number of prominent individuals living in the Barangay that are considered from the social class A as well as depressed areas that consist of the members of Social class E. A notable characteristic of the population of the Barangay is the prominent number of middle class citizens taking residence in the area. One can find the stratification of social classes in the division of streets. Certain streets namely Barasoain and Gen. Mascardo streets are those of the lower social class. While other streets, such as V. Ibañez Street are mostly occupied by the middle and upper class residents of the Barangay.
GovernanceOriginally planned as a residential subdivision, Barangay Little Baguio now consists of a few industrial firms and small businesses segregated throughout the area. The existence of two major Christian exclusive schools, namely Xavier School (formerly Kwang Chi School) and the Immaculate Conception Academy (ICA), and Mary the Queen Parish Church has significantly contributed to the accelerated development of the Barangay.
Currently Barangay Little Baguio has, approximately, a population of 6,221. In the San Juan records, as of 2007-2008, Barangay Little Baguio has a population of 5,484. The difference between the local tally and the national census is due to the non-participation of some citizens in the census.
The Barangay’s population ranges from social classes A to E. In turn, there are a number of prominent individuals living in the Barangay that are considered from the social class A as well as depressed areas that consist of the members of Social class E. A notable characteristic of the population of the Barangay is the prominent number of middle class citizens taking residence in the area. One can find the stratification of social classes in the division of streets. Certain streets namely Barasoain and Gen. Mascardo streets are those of the lower social class. While other streets, such as V. Ibañez Street are mostly occupied by the middle and upper class residents of the Barangay.
The Barangay council of Barangay Little Baguio consists of eleven (11) officials namely, The Barangay Chairman or more commonly known as the barangay Captain or “Cap” for short, followed by seven (7) Kagawad officers that consist of the main body of the Council. The remaining officials include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) chairperson, the Treasurer and the Secretary of the barangay.
The Barangay Chairman or Captain acts as the head of the barangay council and oversees the functions and projects of the barangay. While the members of the barangay council themselves each have a designated role in the numerous committees of the barangay. The names of the officials and their positions are the following:
Notably, the current Barangay Council of Little Baguio is manned by officials from younger generations as compared to the previous council. This change in governance must be noted, for with the inception of younger generation of officials came the implementation of changes in the Barangay that was not even addressed in the earlier council.
The Barangay Chairman or Captain acts as the head of the barangay council and oversees the functions and projects of the barangay. While the members of the barangay council themselves each have a designated role in the numerous committees of the barangay. The names of the officials and their positions are the following:
Allen Christopher M. Silvano Barangay Chairman
1. Anthony Ruiz Caw Kagawad
2. George Gerald P. Ejercito Kagawad
3. Cesar Sanchez Bautista Kagawad
4. Anna Rhea T. Sanchez Kagawad
5. Ricardo Maraya Silvano Kagawad
6. Federico A. Aleman Kagawad
7. Niña Clarival M. Tocino Kagawad
Cherish Hannah C. Adelan Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson
Francisco L. Velazquez Treasurer
Sesinando T. Dela Cruz, Jr. Secretary
1. Anthony Ruiz Caw Kagawad
2. George Gerald P. Ejercito Kagawad
3. Cesar Sanchez Bautista Kagawad
4. Anna Rhea T. Sanchez Kagawad
5. Ricardo Maraya Silvano Kagawad
6. Federico A. Aleman Kagawad
7. Niña Clarival M. Tocino Kagawad
Cherish Hannah C. Adelan Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson
Francisco L. Velazquez Treasurer
Sesinando T. Dela Cruz, Jr. Secretary
Notably, the current Barangay Council of Little Baguio is manned by officials from younger generations as compared to the previous council. This change in governance must be noted, for with the inception of younger generation of officials came the implementation of changes in the Barangay that was not even addressed in the earlier council.
Methodology
As source of primary data, this case study conducted focused interviews with Barangay Chairman Silvano and Security and Order Kagawad Ricardo Silvano, and retrieved Little Baguio’s official crime statistics from years 2007-2008. To guard against human error and partiality, the veracity of their statements during the focused interview was cross-checked with other sources of information like the Barangay Little Baguio’s records, archives of San Juan local government, National Statistics Office, Department of Interior and Local Government, and books on the Philippine legal system, among others.
The discussions in the Review of Related Literature and Conceptual Framework have established the utility and rationale of the conceptual framework. To see if indeed the factors of success included in the framework are relevant to crime prevention, crime rates and crime distribution before the reforms are compared to those during the first year of reforms. This comparison partly answers the problem statement from a quantitative perspective. The information from the focused interview provide explanations to the quantitative findings.
The discussions in the Review of Related Literature and Conceptual Framework have established the utility and rationale of the conceptual framework. To see if indeed the factors of success included in the framework are relevant to crime prevention, crime rates and crime distribution before the reforms are compared to those during the first year of reforms. This comparison partly answers the problem statement from a quantitative perspective. The information from the focused interview provide explanations to the quantitative findings.
Conceptual Framework
This paper takes advantage of CCO’s utility at arranging the complex community safety scenario into a robust, clear, and reputable basis for analysis. The resulting conceptual framework (please refer to the Figure 2 for a visual representation) also selectively borrows from Silverlock and Stafford’s, and Ballintyne and Fraser’s insights. Insights were selected based on their usefulness to the context of a grass-root patrol system like that of Barangay Little Baguio’s. The output of UK researchers clearly needed to be sifted because they are based on different circumstances. For example, UK’s flagship Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and the Safer Cities Program involved greater formal, mandatory collaboration between national and local units, and far greater mobilization in the private, business, and even industrial sectors. Their efforts towards crime prevention even included forays into the overhauling of urban planning, utilization of hi-tech security platforms, demands on industries to change designs of cars and construction materials, review of cultural relations, among others – many of these are naturally reflected in their research endeavors. Clearly, a tight discussion of Little Baguio’s Patrol system will exclude factors that are absent in a Filipino barangay’s reality.
Of the 11 precursors to crime enumerated in the CCO, five are situation–related while the six are offender-related. We focus on only one situation-related precursor which is the Absence of Crime Preventers. Ekblom identifies patrolling as a crime prevention strategy to intervene with the Absence of Crime Preventers.
The patrol’s practical success is anchored on a combination of factors forwarded by Ekblom, and Silverlock and Stafford, and Ballintyne and Fraser with a partiality towards the more parsimonious work of Silverlock and Stafford. The five success factors are Leadership, Funding, Equipment, Manpower and Training, and Consultation. We include Ekblom’s “leadership” because none of Silverlock and Stafford’s success factors seems to account for leadership. We believe that Ekblom’s “technical know-how” is included in “manpower-training”. We put under one category manpower and training because they are complements; sheer manpower will not be effective without training, while training implies that there is manpower to be subjected to training. Ekblom’s reference to “money” is similar to Silverlock and Stafford’s broader term of “funding”, hence funding is used. The other success factors prescribed by the reviewed literature – like infrastructure networks – are omitted because they are remote to the realities of a barangay-level patrol system. Instead of using Silver and Stafford’s “partnership” as another success factor, we replace it with Ballintyne and Fraser’s “consultation”. “Partnership” involves more of multi-agency and industry-community linkages while “consultation” is more effective in connoting community involvement.
As mentioned in the Scope and Limitation, some of the factors discussed in the Conceptual Framework – like consultation –cannot be conveyed through the quantitative data we gathered through field work. But they are still crucial to understand the workings of a barangay-level patrol system.
Another important point in our conceptual framework is how a patrol system has two connections to community safety. First is at the practical level while the other is for conceptual clarity. Firstly, a patrol system is a practice-oriented intervention to the “Absence of Crime Preventers” precursor of crime; successful obstruction of this precursor contributes positively to Community safety.
The second connection of patrol to community safety shows the proper conceptual view of a patrol according to the internationally-acknowledged nomenclature popularized by Wiles and Pease: patrol is a kind of crime prevention while in turn, crime prevention contributes to community safety but is not equivalent to community safety. We include this conceptual clarification to align our case study to the internationally-acknowledged nomenclature in community safety research. Furthermore, a clear view of the place of patrol in the greater scheme of community safety forestalls any misconception about definition of terms and organization of concepts. This is also a reiteration to policy makers and stakeholders that a patrol system is just one of many other initiatives towards community safety.
Of the 11 precursors to crime enumerated in the CCO, five are situation–related while the six are offender-related. We focus on only one situation-related precursor which is the Absence of Crime Preventers. Ekblom identifies patrolling as a crime prevention strategy to intervene with the Absence of Crime Preventers.
The patrol’s practical success is anchored on a combination of factors forwarded by Ekblom, and Silverlock and Stafford, and Ballintyne and Fraser with a partiality towards the more parsimonious work of Silverlock and Stafford. The five success factors are Leadership, Funding, Equipment, Manpower and Training, and Consultation. We include Ekblom’s “leadership” because none of Silverlock and Stafford’s success factors seems to account for leadership. We believe that Ekblom’s “technical know-how” is included in “manpower-training”. We put under one category manpower and training because they are complements; sheer manpower will not be effective without training, while training implies that there is manpower to be subjected to training. Ekblom’s reference to “money” is similar to Silverlock and Stafford’s broader term of “funding”, hence funding is used. The other success factors prescribed by the reviewed literature – like infrastructure networks – are omitted because they are remote to the realities of a barangay-level patrol system. Instead of using Silver and Stafford’s “partnership” as another success factor, we replace it with Ballintyne and Fraser’s “consultation”. “Partnership” involves more of multi-agency and industry-community linkages while “consultation” is more effective in connoting community involvement.
As mentioned in the Scope and Limitation, some of the factors discussed in the Conceptual Framework – like consultation –cannot be conveyed through the quantitative data we gathered through field work. But they are still crucial to understand the workings of a barangay-level patrol system.
Another important point in our conceptual framework is how a patrol system has two connections to community safety. First is at the practical level while the other is for conceptual clarity. Firstly, a patrol system is a practice-oriented intervention to the “Absence of Crime Preventers” precursor of crime; successful obstruction of this precursor contributes positively to Community safety.
The second connection of patrol to community safety shows the proper conceptual view of a patrol according to the internationally-acknowledged nomenclature popularized by Wiles and Pease: patrol is a kind of crime prevention while in turn, crime prevention contributes to community safety but is not equivalent to community safety. We include this conceptual clarification to align our case study to the internationally-acknowledged nomenclature in community safety research. Furthermore, a clear view of the place of patrol in the greater scheme of community safety forestalls any misconception about definition of terms and organization of concepts. This is also a reiteration to policy makers and stakeholders that a patrol system is just one of many other initiatives towards community safety.
Review of Related Literature
A review of widely published literature engaged in active and long-standing study in community safety led us to foreign scholarly works, especially to those in the United Kingdom. The UK has long decentralized their community safety platform to more local levels and this is similar with our own Local Government Code of 1991. The UK’s exemplary sophistication in community safety research, their prodigious output, vigorous scholarly collisions, and the prominence of community safety research in the UK may be attributed to the formal, published, occasionally state-commissioned research tradition which was already energetic even in the early 80’s. Unlike in the UK, there seems to be no heated crucible of peer critiquing, theory contestation and refinement in the Philippines’s community safety research – hence, we did not find readily available, published output. Fortunately, we found out that it is not uncommon for UK output in this area to be exported to other countries. In fact, the Australian Government’s Institute of Criminology and Latin American countries like Mexico benefit from British scholarly works like Paul Ekblom’s conjunction of criminal opportunity (CCO). These prove that leading works from the UK tradition have reputed applicability in other contexts worldwide. Furthermore, the wide acceptance of their most influential works gives credibility to an attempt to borrow their output for community safety research in the Philippines – such as this inquiry into a local patrol system.
It is convenient to assume that a patrol system is immediately aimed at community safety. But Paul Wiles and Ken Pease caution that community safety is a multi-pronged effort towards the minimization of the number and seriousness of harm in the community; not only crime, but also accidents, serendipitous misfortunes, social volatility, health risks, environmental undesirables, among others, constitute harm. Conversely, they argue that crime prevention and/or crime reduction is just one of many avenues to community safety.
It is indeed plausible that a conceptual framework which directly subordinates patrol system to community safety may erroneously connote that crime-centered initiatives like patrol systems are the main avenue to community safety. Furthermore, directly subordinating patrol system to community safety exposes an undeniable conceptual gap. Here, the utility of Wiles and Pease’s argument becomes evident: a patrol system is not a direct subordinate to community safety. It can be viewed instead as a strategy of crime prevention, and in turn, crime prevention is an element of community safety.
To avoid the muddled analysis which the literature warns against, the definitions of crime prevention and its distinction from crime reduction deserve mention here. Ekblom’s body of work behind CCO helpfully defines crime reduction as a “present and future-oriented effort to reduce the number of crime and disorder events and the seriousness of their consequences, by intervening directly in the events and in their causes. This can be distinguished from crime prevention which is the “future-oriented efforts to reduce the risk of occurrence and the potential seriousness of crime and disorder events, by intervening in the causes.” Crime reduction deals with chronic conditions and even seeks to intervene in an event as it happens (present and future-oriented). In practice, there is little crime reduction efforts which don’t have preventive aspects. Similarly, successful crime prevention primarily seeks to pre-empt crime (future-oriented) and thus reduce the incidence of crime. Ekblom explicitly labels patrolling as a crime prevention effort.
Paul Ekblom’s framework of conjunction of criminal opportunity, one of the most widely-applied community safety concepts inside and outside Europe, is naturally an important work that cannot be missed. His framework is an integration of both the situation-related and offender-related causes which all conjunct into a crime or disorder event. The framework enumerates 11 pre-cursors of crime and also identifies interventions for each. The literature also enumerates factors which have been observed as central to practical success. According to Ekblom, capacity building-level is crucial and must be buttressed through technical know-how, equipment, money, leadership skills, access to crime preventers, among many others. Alternatively, Leslie Silverlock and Julia Stafford’s work provides a more parsimonious prescription that funding, standards, training and partnership increase chances of success.
Interestingly, Stafford and Silverlock’s claim of the importance of partnership resonates with other studies. Scott Ballintyne and Penny Fraser provide an evidence-based assertion that consultation and dialogue with stakeholders increase the effectiveness of efforts at community safety.
This section only tackled literature directly related to the construction of this case study’s conceptual framework. Other pertinent literature we surveyed will be introduced as needed.
It is convenient to assume that a patrol system is immediately aimed at community safety. But Paul Wiles and Ken Pease caution that community safety is a multi-pronged effort towards the minimization of the number and seriousness of harm in the community; not only crime, but also accidents, serendipitous misfortunes, social volatility, health risks, environmental undesirables, among others, constitute harm. Conversely, they argue that crime prevention and/or crime reduction is just one of many avenues to community safety.
It is indeed plausible that a conceptual framework which directly subordinates patrol system to community safety may erroneously connote that crime-centered initiatives like patrol systems are the main avenue to community safety. Furthermore, directly subordinating patrol system to community safety exposes an undeniable conceptual gap. Here, the utility of Wiles and Pease’s argument becomes evident: a patrol system is not a direct subordinate to community safety. It can be viewed instead as a strategy of crime prevention, and in turn, crime prevention is an element of community safety.
To avoid the muddled analysis which the literature warns against, the definitions of crime prevention and its distinction from crime reduction deserve mention here. Ekblom’s body of work behind CCO helpfully defines crime reduction as a “present and future-oriented effort to reduce the number of crime and disorder events and the seriousness of their consequences, by intervening directly in the events and in their causes. This can be distinguished from crime prevention which is the “future-oriented efforts to reduce the risk of occurrence and the potential seriousness of crime and disorder events, by intervening in the causes.” Crime reduction deals with chronic conditions and even seeks to intervene in an event as it happens (present and future-oriented). In practice, there is little crime reduction efforts which don’t have preventive aspects. Similarly, successful crime prevention primarily seeks to pre-empt crime (future-oriented) and thus reduce the incidence of crime. Ekblom explicitly labels patrolling as a crime prevention effort.
Paul Ekblom’s framework of conjunction of criminal opportunity, one of the most widely-applied community safety concepts inside and outside Europe, is naturally an important work that cannot be missed. His framework is an integration of both the situation-related and offender-related causes which all conjunct into a crime or disorder event. The framework enumerates 11 pre-cursors of crime and also identifies interventions for each. The literature also enumerates factors which have been observed as central to practical success. According to Ekblom, capacity building-level is crucial and must be buttressed through technical know-how, equipment, money, leadership skills, access to crime preventers, among many others. Alternatively, Leslie Silverlock and Julia Stafford’s work provides a more parsimonious prescription that funding, standards, training and partnership increase chances of success.
Interestingly, Stafford and Silverlock’s claim of the importance of partnership resonates with other studies. Scott Ballintyne and Penny Fraser provide an evidence-based assertion that consultation and dialogue with stakeholders increase the effectiveness of efforts at community safety.
This section only tackled literature directly related to the construction of this case study’s conceptual framework. Other pertinent literature we surveyed will be introduced as needed.
Objectives of the Study
This case study is designed to establish the relationships between the two sets of variables without ignoring other factors which have impact on the Barangay Patrol system. In doing so, this case study aspires to provide the Barangay and its various stake holders a fresh comprehensive, systematic description of the crime situation and the efforts to address the crime situation in the barangay through the barangay patrol. The case study details the evolution of patrolling in the barangay, the causes, the process, maintenance, financing, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the patrol.
An informative and instructive presentation of key findings in the form of simple but visually-appealing graphs and tables are to be disseminated to communicate the progress and setbacks of patrolling practices in Barangay Little Baguio. With the cooperation of Barangay officials, these informative materials can be posted in conspicuous places in the Barangay Little Baguio. The case study will be presented to the Barangay not only as recommendations for improvement but also as a documentation of their recent history.
Ultimately, this case study’s objective is to help community leaders increase the effectiveness of patrol practices in maintaining security due to the officials’ better knowledge of best practices and the public’s awareness of the community safety efforts.
This case study is designed to establish the relationships between the two sets of variables without ignoring other factors which have impact on the Barangay Patrol system. In doing so, this case study aspires to provide the Barangay and its various stake holders a fresh comprehensive, systematic description of the crime situation and the efforts to address the crime situation in the barangay through the barangay patrol. The case study details the evolution of patrolling in the barangay, the causes, the process, maintenance, financing, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the patrol.
An informative and instructive presentation of key findings in the form of simple but visually-appealing graphs and tables are to be disseminated to communicate the progress and setbacks of patrolling practices in Barangay Little Baguio. With the cooperation of Barangay officials, these informative materials can be posted in conspicuous places in the Barangay Little Baguio. The case study will be presented to the Barangay not only as recommendations for improvement but also as a documentation of their recent history.
Ultimately, this case study’s objective is to help community leaders increase the effectiveness of patrol practices in maintaining security due to the officials’ better knowledge of best practices and the public’s awareness of the community safety efforts.
An informative and instructive presentation of key findings in the form of simple but visually-appealing graphs and tables are to be disseminated to communicate the progress and setbacks of patrolling practices in Barangay Little Baguio. With the cooperation of Barangay officials, these informative materials can be posted in conspicuous places in the Barangay Little Baguio. The case study will be presented to the Barangay not only as recommendations for improvement but also as a documentation of their recent history.
Ultimately, this case study’s objective is to help community leaders increase the effectiveness of patrol practices in maintaining security due to the officials’ better knowledge of best practices and the public’s awareness of the community safety efforts.
This case study is designed to establish the relationships between the two sets of variables without ignoring other factors which have impact on the Barangay Patrol system. In doing so, this case study aspires to provide the Barangay and its various stake holders a fresh comprehensive, systematic description of the crime situation and the efforts to address the crime situation in the barangay through the barangay patrol. The case study details the evolution of patrolling in the barangay, the causes, the process, maintenance, financing, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the patrol.
An informative and instructive presentation of key findings in the form of simple but visually-appealing graphs and tables are to be disseminated to communicate the progress and setbacks of patrolling practices in Barangay Little Baguio. With the cooperation of Barangay officials, these informative materials can be posted in conspicuous places in the Barangay Little Baguio. The case study will be presented to the Barangay not only as recommendations for improvement but also as a documentation of their recent history.
Ultimately, this case study’s objective is to help community leaders increase the effectiveness of patrol practices in maintaining security due to the officials’ better knowledge of best practices and the public’s awareness of the community safety efforts.
Introduction to the Study
Security Issues before the Reforms in Patrol System
Barangay Little Baguio is one of San Juan, Manila’s 21 barangays; it has an area of 43.7156 has (hectares) and has a population of 5,484 according to the latest government census. When incumbent Barangay Chairman Allen Christopher M. Silvano took over the reins of Barangay Little Baguio in December 2007, the Barangay’s security, peace and order were plagued by alarming incidences of crime, non-alignment with the Department of Interior and Local Government’s advocacies, and symptoms of the Barangay’s inadequate responsiveness to peace and order situations.
Due to the rampant thefts of cables, not only were Barangay residents inconvenienced by service disruptions, even stricken companies like PLDT eventually voiced their grievances to the San Juan local government unit. The series of cable thefts in Little Baguio contributed to the cumulative losses of telecommunications companies which have amounted to P13.7 million from 2005 to August 2007, according to the records of the National Telecommunications Commission. As of 2007, high-grade copper from communication cables fetch around P25 to 40 per kilo in junkyards. But for telecommunication firms, every meter of stolen cable is equivalent to a loss of P1,500 to P5,200. The figures presented here do not even reflect the theft-related opportunity and indirect costs shouldered by the residents and the business establishments.
The community’s water meters were also widely targeted because of their high-grade copper content. The repercussions of water meter theft merit emphasis because unlike telecommunication cables, water is an immediate household necessity. Although it may be expected that quick action would be taken against the disruption of a resource as vital as water, the water meter thefts persisted throughout 2007. The temerity of water meter thieves in Little Baguio hinted at the Metro Manila-wide vulnerability of water meters to theft. This widespread vulnerability undoubtedly contributed to Manila Water’s non-revenue water (NRW) rate of 23.9 % in 2007. Although it is contentious to argue that the elimination of water meter theft in Little Baguio could have a significant impact on Manila Water’s reduction of non-earning water output, it is arguable that like in the case of cable pilfering, Little Baguio’s rampant water meter thefts in 2007 also had consequences beyond the convenience and security of the Barangay territory. Efficiency in water distribution and profitability in Manila Water’s investments were involved.
Furthermore, failure to deter water meter theft was tantamount to allowing the proliferation of criminal activity not only in the confines of Little Baguio but also in the area of San Juan. Thieves and criminal organizations are not bound by territory and can criss-cross different barangays depending on the latter’s laxity of vigilance. Having congruent mandates and goals issuing from a cohesive set of values, government units are expected to cooperate with each other. Responding inadequately to a problem which spills-over to the concern-areas of other government units seems inconsistent to cooperative governance. Perhaps what made the task more daunting and rendered efforts inadequate is the fact that criminal organizations have been exploiting R.A. 9344 or the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006”. In both cable and water meter thefts, many suspects were below 18 years old and were afforded certain protection. For example, those 15 years old or under enjoy exemption from criminal liability. Thus, they find it easier to escape the gaze of the law and return to their own devices and criminal groups.
Aside from the complications of minors “in conflict with law”, the issue of violence against women and children revealed another dent in Little Baguio’s security and order efforts during the previous barangay council. As early as January 2005, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Liga ng mga Barangay (LnB), the umbrella organization the country’s barangays, jointly spearheaded a nationwide advocacy campaign on "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" otherwise known as R.A. 9262. To give the barangay a crucial role in coordinated efforts and feedback mechanism at the grassroots level, DILG launched programs to educate barangay officials on R.A. 9262. As early as 2005, DILG and LnB clearly urged barangays to employ systematic and concrete measures to enforce R.A. 9262. This is ideally a part of any tanod’s training or knowledge, especially for patrol members. However, Chairman Silvano attested that when he assumed office in December 2007, the Barangay was not wholly aligned with the DILF security directive as evidenced by the absence of a Violence against Women and Children (VAWC) Desk in the Barangay.
Furthermore, only six tanods used to patrol Little Baguio’s 43 sq.km territory. Most were on foot or on bikes because of lack of equipment. Chairman Silvano expressly commented that by the time his term started in late 2007, Little Baguio’s patrol manpower, training, and equipment needed improvement.
Statement of the Problem
A description of the cable and water meter thefts, failure to systematically include VAWC knowledge among tanods, and a cursory presentation of the inadequacies in manpower, patrol training, and equipment all portray the challenges that Chairman Silvano’s reforms have sought to remedy. Succinctly stated, this study is concerned with assessing the impact, effectiveness, and prospects of Barangay Little Baguio’s reformed Patrol System as a response to the security and order issues of the community. As an explicit guide for developing the case study, the problem statement involves two sets of variables – the first set of variables includes the innovations introduced by Chairman Silvano’s reforms while the second set of variables primarily includes the crime rates and crime types before and after the reforms. The variables mentioned, like manpower, patrol training, and equipment will be organized according to our conceptual framework.
A refinement of the research query entails three main thrusts: Firstly, this study includes a descriptive presentation of the security and order conditions of Little Baguio before and after the patrol reforms. Secondly, this study also attempts to provide an explanatory dimension to the relationships of the variables gathered. Finally, the study draws from the relationships of the two sets of variables and attempt to include a prescriptive aspect by forwarding recommendations on how to improve the patrol system. The prescriptive aspects also consider the possible synergies of the patrol system with other barangay initiatives that aim for community welfare.
A basic problem statement requires scrutiny into the following questions: Does a greater number of patrol tanods decrease crime in the Barangay, and why? Does having more and better equipment, training, for patrols lower crime rates in the Barangay? Does the creation of a special VAWC Desk have any synergy to the patrol system in its efforts to reduce crime or does it have any impact on the incidence and types of crime in the Barangay? What are the other relevant reforms of Chairman Silvano? Did these reforms improve the security of the Barangay? What are the weaknesses and areas for improvement?
Scope and Limitations
Though the aforementioned questions suggest the scope of the case study, they do not explicitly mention the entire scenario captured by the data from the field work. Hence, the study’s scope covers some factors that are not directly attached to crime rates – even if quantitative data on crime rates indeed form an important part of the case study. Pedantic reliance on the quantitative data of crime rates can mute the factors that seem remote to the oscillation of crime rates but are found by our research (from field work, and through a review of literature) to have effects to the patrol system. Guided by the conceptual framework that will be explained in the succeeding sections, seemingly non-crime related factors like funding and community involvement are also tackled to the extent of their relevance to Chairman Silvano’s patrol reforms.
It must be reiterated that this study chiefly concerns itself with the reformed Barangay Little Baguio’s patrol as a way to prevent crime and thereby contribute to community safety. The past patrol system will only be discussed along its stark and meaningful differences with the reformed system; thus, this study should not be expected to explore the complete circumstances which explain the performance of the previous barangay council’s patrol system. Furthermore, this study does not include the new barangay council’s other reforms which may be aimed at community safety but have no direct impact on the patrol system.
Though the aforementioned questions suggest the scope of the case study, they do not explicitly mention the entire scenario captured by the data from the field work. Hence, the study’s scope covers some factors that are not directly attached to crime rates – even if quantitative data on crime rates indeed form an important part of the case study. Pedantic reliance on the quantitative data of crime rates can mute the factors that seem remote to the oscillation of crime rates but are found by our research (from field work, and through a review of literature) to have effects to the patrol system. Guided by the conceptual framework that will be explained in the succeeding sections, seemingly non-crime related factors like funding and community involvement are also tackled to the extent of their relevance to Chairman Silvano’s patrol reforms.
It must be reiterated that this study chiefly concerns itself with the reformed Barangay Little Baguio’s patrol as a way to prevent crime and thereby contribute to community safety. The past patrol system will only be discussed along its stark and meaningful differences with the reformed system; thus, this study should not be expected to explore the complete circumstances which explain the performance of the previous barangay council’s patrol system. Furthermore, this study does not include the new barangay council’s other reforms which may be aimed at community safety but have no direct impact on the patrol system.
Hypothesis
Based on the review of related literature and preliminary assessment of the Barangay Little Baguio, we forward three hypotheses.
Firstly, mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime prevention.
Secondly, leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime.
Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous assessment.
Organization of the Study
The case study is divided into four main parts: introduction, data, analysis and recommendations, and conclusion. The preceding part will focus on the gathered data. The first section will present a more detailed description of Barangay Little Baguio including the pertinent history and demographics. The exact pre-reform crime rates, crime-type prevalence, and pertinent supplementary information are presented. The past Barangay council’s responses to these crime rates are then mentioned. Afterwards, the implementation of reforms in the patrol system, the initiatives for reform, organization, financing, patrol recruitment, patrol training, equipment, and notable activities are discussed in detail. Imbedded in the discussion are the crucial differences between the current reforms and the previous responses of the past Barangay Council. The latter section of the succeeding Part will compare the crime rates and crime-type prevalence during the implementation of the reformed patrol system.
The third part is devoted to the analysis of data. The efficacy of the patrol reforms will be partially scrutinized in light of the relationships between the two sets of variables. Reasons for success or failure will be explained as well as other factors that might have also influenced the relationships. As always, the conceptual framework will be applied where useful. Recommendations to improve the patrol system will then be outlined. Possibilities, vulnerabilities, and predictions gleaned from the literature are also enumerated to aid stakeholders in gearing the patrol system for the challenges ahead.
Relationships and insights which have compelling evidences will be highlighted as possible hypotheses with wider generalizability and applicability to other barangays. However, caveats about Little Baguio’s particularities will be forwarded as reasons to be cautious in implying generalizability.
The third part is devoted to the analysis of data. The efficacy of the patrol reforms will be partially scrutinized in light of the relationships between the two sets of variables. Reasons for success or failure will be explained as well as other factors that might have also influenced the relationships. As always, the conceptual framework will be applied where useful. Recommendations to improve the patrol system will then be outlined. Possibilities, vulnerabilities, and predictions gleaned from the literature are also enumerated to aid stakeholders in gearing the patrol system for the challenges ahead.
Relationships and insights which have compelling evidences will be highlighted as possible hypotheses with wider generalizability and applicability to other barangays. However, caveats about Little Baguio’s particularities will be forwarded as reasons to be cautious in implying generalizability.
A Little Introduction to the Function of this Blog
Good Morning, Good Afternoon or Good Evening,
This Blog primary purpose is to post our findings on our research paper entitled
"Effective Practices and Possibilites in Barangay Patrol: A Case Study of Barangay Little Baguio's Patrol System"
The sections of the Blog are subdivided by the chapter headings of the original paper, but the articles will be summarized to include only the relevant and the information that is easier to dissect.
The full research paper is uploaded in the yahoo groups created for this endeavor, the link to the yahoogroups is:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/astudyofbarangaylittlebaguioanditssecuritysystem/
If anyone wishes to be a member please e-mail me with the Subject: FOR EU 31 PAPER and give a short message about your intentions and who you are.
Thank you.
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