This case study delves into the crime situation in Barangay Little Baguio and the barangay council’s specific crime prevention response in the form of the patrol. In doing so, this case study aspires to provide the Barangay and its various stake holders a fresh comprehensive, systematic description of the crime situation and the efforts to address the crime situation in the barangay through the barangay patrol. The case study details the evolution of patrolling in the barangay, the causes, the process, maintenance, financing, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the patrol. These are done using a conceptual framework based on work of Ekblom, Stafford and Silverlock, Ballyntine and Fraser, and Wiles and Pease. Their works have been selectively reformulated to suit the barangay-level patrol. The framework’s highlight is the identification of five factors of success: leadership, consultation, manpower-training, funding, and equipment. The conceptual framework also precludes misconceptions by reiterating that patrol efforts is just one of many crime prevention efforts, while the latter in turn, is one of many avenues to achieve community safety.
The data shows a noticeable, but not a comprehensive decrease in crime rates after introduction of the reform variables. The data also shows that the new barangay leaders instituted reforms that can be categorized into the framework’s five success factors.
Three succinct answers to the hypotheses can be gleaned from the analysis of historical and quantitative data. Firstly, Little Baguio’s experience illustrates that mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime prevention.
Secondly, even if the data does not show crime decrease across the board, there is proof to believe that leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime. The analysis of the data reveals proof that the reform variables conform to the five success factors which have been based on scholarly literature. This finding supports an optimistic realization that a there is growing evidence that a barangay-level patrol can be predictably improved based on known variables. Also, we are informed that manipulating foreign literature to suit local realities can be productive when grounded in reason.
Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous assessment. For this reason, literature has been consulted to include warnings that can help stakeholders increase the patrol system’s anticipatory capacity, policy flexibility, and awareness of its horizons. Crime displacement, obsolescence, complacency, and sustainability of values, knowledge, best practices must be kept in mind.
Lastly, while the study opens up other possible research leads like the question of “distance from deterrence”, it also encourages further testing of the conceptual framework’s applicability to other Filipino barangay contexts. However, the Little Baguio barangay-level patrol’s noticeable success may be partly serendipitous and not structural. Hence, caveats against applicability are acknowledged to avoid packaging the Little Baguio patrol experience as a one-size fit all solution to patrol ineffectiveness anywhere.
