Firstly, mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime prevention, During the mid-90’s, Little Baguio was voted as one of San Juan’s most peaceful barangayas but the years leading to 2007 saw a rise in crimes. Indeed, mere presence is not enough to effect oticeable crime prevention.
Secondly, leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime. The inclusion of these variables in before mid 2008 noticeably changed the crime rates. The data does not reject this hypothesis but does not offer comprehensive results. The analysis has suggested the links between these variables and their effects on crime. At this point, there is sufficient reason to believe that in the Philippine’s context, these five success variables have a palpable effect on crime prevention just like the claims of the literature. However, a more satisifying elucidation will require data on crime rates of more years.
Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous assessment. Again the success in the mid-90’s and the spike of crimes in the years leading to 2007 confirm that there is a possibility for a reversal. The causes of these reversals are multitude. And if ever the current promising patrol reforms bloom into a period of security similar to the mid-90’s, the causes of the reformed patrol’s reversal into ineffectiveness remain to be seen – if ever such a reversal will occur notwithstanding the literature and this case study’s agreement that it is likely to occur. The following section gives an account of the literature’s analysis on these prospects.
Warnings: Future Vulnerabilities, Anticipated Possibilities
The vibrant community safety literature we have surveyed reveal empirically-compelling findings and documented cases about probable vulnerabilities, and anticipated possibilities usually encountered by crime prevention efforts like patrol systems that have already attained a level of success. While the previous sections give recommendations on how to improve the five identified success-factors of a barangay-level patrol system, this section tackles the probable predicaments the barangay will face when it is already around a certain level of success. Discussing these warnings is crucial in helping the stakeholders increase the patrol system’s anticipatory capacity, policy flexibility, and awareness of its horizons. Clearly, we stand to learn from the experiences distilled in the literature to better maneuver from known faulty policies, and ignorance.
Crime displacement.
Perhaps the most immediately relevant waning to the patrol system is the issue of crime displacement, which is the “alleged tendency of prevented crime to move to other locales.” For many years, countries which have had started earlier in decentralizing crime prevention were embroiled in the crime displacement debate. The critics of crime prevention and community safety allege that efforts to curb crime do not result to net gains for society because the spatial displacement of the perpetrators of crime offset any crime prevention gains. Furthermore, proponents of crime displacement, argue that the resources poured into crime prevention and the associated opportunity costs all go to waste. In the context of Little Baguio, the criminals discouraged by the higher risks may only transfer to the less prepared communities bordering Little Baguio along Santolan Rd., P. Guevarra Street and Wilson Street, or even miles away from Little Baguio. Unfortunately, crime displacement is an intuitively plausible argument.
Furthermore, crime prevention efforts like patrol system largely affect the situation-side and not the offender-side, thus, the pool of willing criminals are not directly thwarted. In many instances, the crime displacement argument has encouraged inaction and passivity. Furthermore, areas which do not have the resources to buttress their crime prevention efforts resent it when criminals are displaces to their territory due to the successful crime prevention efforts of more capable areas.
If Little Baguio’s stakeholders encounter this argument, they must be aware that crime displacement has already been discredited. In 1994, Hessling’s empirical work conclude that crime displacement is “possible, but not an inevitable consequence of crime prevention. Further, if displacement does occur, it will be in limited size and scope.” It must be clear that Little Baguio’s stakeholders must learn from the documented community prevention efforts which were hampered because of the passivity and inaction forwarded by the crime displacement.
Obsolescence.
Indeed, while our field work has shown the considerable vigor of the current leadership to improve patrols, literature has also documented the resilience of offenders in adapting to the new crime prevention schemes. Gloria Laycock and Barry Webb contend that there is evidence that problems usually return after a lull because offenders uncover the real risks of being apprehended (it may actually lower than first thought), and find ways to circumvent the deterrents. Given the knowledge of patrol systems presented in the previous part, a creative and determined criminal will not find it exceedingly hard to breach Little Baguio’s Patrols and victimize its affluent residents. For example, in stealing water meters, thieves can post mobile watchmen while their partners steal water meters as long as the coast is clear of any patrols.
Furthermore, if the streets pose higher risks of being caught, why not do crime inside the houses when their owners are at work and only gullible maids are home? In fact, Chairman Silvano recounted a recent similar incident where a thief pretended to be the home owner’s relative. The maid let him in and he consequently robbed an item.
Community leaders must calibrate their expectations to the reality that success may be in the short-term. Public perception must also be conditioned to the realistic expectation of a patrol’s performance; so that the when crimes suddenly spike after the initial success, the reputation of the barangay leadership and the patrol itself are cushioned from disproportionate criticism. Public perception can be influenced by holding meaningful and regular dialogues or consultation – like the ones Chairman Silvano has already began. These regular dialogues must also be used to inform the community of the changing “techniques” and modus operandi of the criminals.
Complacency.
While obsolescence highlights the cunning of the criminals, complacency describes the crime preventers’ gradual fading of vigilance after a surge of success. According to Hill and Pease, “Decreasing crime rates yield transitory praise followed by conviction that there is no longer a problem, all too often followed by a resurgence of crime.” Again, this is a warning that initial success may not be for long.
Little Baguio’s stakeholders must guard against complacency because this is less acceptable than obsolescence, which is offender-related. It is unthinkable to tell the community that crimes are rising again due to the patrol’s complacency. The worst case scenario is when obsolescence and complacency coincide, which is likely because complacency exposes the system to obsolescence. Perhaps a concrete measure to guard against complacency is to explicitly instruct the patrol teams to investigate the new techniques of the criminals. These learnings must be included in the mandatory written reports of the patrol teams. Learning firsthand of the new activities of criminals and the possible obsolescence of the current patrol system may jolt the patrol from complacency. The information on recent criminal activities gathered by patrols can then be shared to community during dialogues or consultations.
Sustainability.
The literature admonishes us that many crime prevention efforts –both successful and unsuccessful- have neglected the sustainability of their efforts. Patrol sustainability may be elaborated along the conceptual framework’s five success-factors: sustainability in best leadership practices, equipment, training, consultation, funding. Just to illustrate, let us revisit familiar questions like: what is the equipment’s period of usefulness? What can be done to decrease the rate of equipment depreciation? What can be done to retain the pool of trained and experienced patrollers? Or at the very least, what can be done to preserve their expertise?
These patrollers might be lured by other work opportunities, or may leave the patrol when the barangay leadership is changed. How will funding be sustained when the cost of crime prevention is likely to rise? When greater effort is demanded from patrollers who have to cope with the evolving face of crime, these patrollers may demand greater compensation. In Little Baguio, Chairman Silvano’s wide connections and placement in society has allowed the barangay to obtain free equipment and other sources of funding. What if the next chairman is not as well connected? Where will they get spontaneous sources of funding which has proven to be instrumental in the reformed patrol efforts?
The more pressing issue is in what will be done when the set of leaders are replaced. The policies and disposition of the new leadership may be inconsistent with that of the former leadership. What mechanisms are in place to sustain the patrol system’s quality? From the old barangay chairman to the new, and from the old patrollers to the new, there must be a transmission of knowledge, and a congruence of values. Without these, it is hard to imagine sustainable successful patrol efforts.
Surely, Little Baguio’s current practice of including an experienced kagawad in each patrol team is in the direction of sustainability. But Chairman Silvano must also make sure that when his term ends (if he is replaced or if he finishes the limit of three consecutive terms) there is a transmission of knowledge from the old council to the new. Furthermore, Chairman Silvano must compel the new council to conform to the values which have made the patrol system better than how he found it. From these, we can see the importance of properly documented, easily accessible written reports or records regarding the goings-one in the barangay, especially those that concern crime prevention, crime statistics, regular patrol reports, new criminal activity updates etc… When knowledge and values are encoded on paper, sustainability is enhanced.
However, accumulating quantities of written knowledge is not enough; it has been observed that quality and relevance of sustainability-oriented knowledge must also be given attention. Literature warns that stakeholders tend to meet in planning and meeting alone and devote little time to up-skilling, reflecting and updating. Clearly,
Lastly, though it may impinge on the current chairman’s personal prerogatives (we don’t know the politics between the incumbent and the successor), it may be for the barangay’s best interest if he introduce his successor to his generous connections. This will increase the probability of the barangay sustaining its spontaneous sources of financing.
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