Introduction to the Study

Security Issues before the Reforms in Patrol System

Barangay Little Baguio is one of San Juan, Manila’s 21 barangays; it has an area of 43.7156 has (hectares) and has a population of 5,484 according to the latest government census. When incumbent Barangay Chairman Allen Christopher M. Silvano took over the reins of Barangay Little Baguio in December 2007, the Barangay’s security, peace and order were plagued by alarming incidences of crime, non-alignment with the Department of Interior and Local Government’s advocacies, and symptoms of the Barangay’s inadequate responsiveness to peace and order situations.

Due to the rampant thefts of cables, not only were Barangay residents inconvenienced by service disruptions, even stricken companies like PLDT eventually voiced their grievances to the San Juan local government unit. The series of cable thefts in Little Baguio contributed to the cumulative losses of telecommunications companies which have amounted to P13.7 million from 2005 to August 2007, according to the records of the National Telecommunications Commission. As of 2007, high-grade copper from communication cables fetch around P25 to 40 per kilo in junkyards. But for telecommunication firms, every meter of stolen cable is equivalent to a loss of P1,500 to P5,200. The figures presented here do not even reflect the theft-related opportunity and indirect costs shouldered by the residents and the business establishments.

The community’s water meters were also widely targeted because of their high-grade copper content. The repercussions of water meter theft merit emphasis because unlike telecommunication cables, water is an immediate household necessity. Although it may be expected that quick action would be taken against the disruption of a resource as vital as water, the water meter thefts persisted throughout 2007. The temerity of water meter thieves in Little Baguio hinted at the Metro Manila-wide vulnerability of water meters to theft. This widespread vulnerability undoubtedly contributed to Manila Water’s non-revenue water (NRW) rate of 23.9 % in 2007. Although it is contentious to argue that the elimination of water meter theft in Little Baguio could have a significant impact on Manila Water’s reduction of non-earning water output, it is arguable that like in the case of cable pilfering, Little Baguio’s rampant water meter thefts in 2007 also had consequences beyond the convenience and security of the Barangay territory. Efficiency in water distribution and profitability in Manila Water’s investments were involved.
Furthermore, failure to deter water meter theft was tantamount to allowing the proliferation of criminal activity not only in the confines of Little Baguio but also in the area of San Juan. Thieves and criminal organizations are not bound by territory and can criss-cross different barangays depending on the latter’s laxity of vigilance. Having congruent mandates and goals issuing from a cohesive set of values, government units are expected to cooperate with each other. Responding inadequately to a problem which spills-over to the concern-areas of other government units seems inconsistent to cooperative governance. Perhaps what made the task more daunting and rendered efforts inadequate is the fact that criminal organizations have been exploiting R.A. 9344 or the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006”. In both cable and water meter thefts, many suspects were below 18 years old and were afforded certain protection. For example, those 15 years old or under enjoy exemption from criminal liability. Thus, they find it easier to escape the gaze of the law and return to their own devices and criminal groups.

Aside from the complications of minors “in conflict with law”, the issue of violence against women and children revealed another dent in Little Baguio’s security and order efforts during the previous barangay council. As early as January 2005, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Liga ng mga Barangay (LnB), the umbrella organization the country’s barangays, jointly spearheaded a nationwide advocacy campaign on "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" otherwise known as R.A. 9262. To give the barangay a crucial role in coordinated efforts and feedback mechanism at the grassroots level, DILG launched programs to educate barangay officials on R.A. 9262. As early as 2005, DILG and LnB clearly urged barangays to employ systematic and concrete measures to enforce R.A. 9262. This is ideally a part of any tanod’s training or knowledge, especially for patrol members. However, Chairman Silvano attested that when he assumed office in December 2007, the Barangay was not wholly aligned with the DILF security directive as evidenced by the absence of a Violence against Women and Children (VAWC) Desk in the Barangay.

Furthermore, only six tanods used to patrol Little Baguio’s 43 sq.km territory. Most were on foot or on bikes because of lack of equipment. Chairman Silvano expressly commented that by the time his term started in late 2007, Little Baguio’s patrol manpower, training, and equipment needed improvement.

Statement of the Problem

A description of the cable and water meter thefts, failure to systematically include VAWC knowledge among tanods, and a cursory presentation of the inadequacies in manpower, patrol training, and equipment all portray the challenges that Chairman Silvano’s reforms have sought to remedy. Succinctly stated, this study is concerned with assessing the impact, effectiveness, and prospects of Barangay Little Baguio’s reformed Patrol System as a response to the security and order issues of the community. As an explicit guide for developing the case study, the problem statement involves two sets of variables – the first set of variables includes the innovations introduced by Chairman Silvano’s reforms while the second set of variables primarily includes the crime rates and crime types before and after the reforms. The variables mentioned, like manpower, patrol training, and equipment will be organized according to our conceptual framework.

A refinement of the research query entails three main thrusts: Firstly, this study includes a descriptive presentation of the security and order conditions of Little Baguio before and after the patrol reforms. Secondly, this study also attempts to provide an explanatory dimension to the relationships of the variables gathered. Finally, the study draws from the relationships of the two sets of variables and attempt to include a prescriptive aspect by forwarding recommendations on how to improve the patrol system. The prescriptive aspects also consider the possible synergies of the patrol system with other barangay initiatives that aim for community welfare.
A basic problem statement requires scrutiny into the following questions: Does a greater number of patrol tanods decrease crime in the Barangay, and why? Does having more and better equipment, training, for patrols lower crime rates in the Barangay? Does the creation of a special VAWC Desk have any synergy to the patrol system in its efforts to reduce crime or does it have any impact on the incidence and types of crime in the Barangay? What are the other relevant reforms of Chairman Silvano? Did these reforms improve the security of the Barangay? What are the weaknesses and areas for improvement?

Scope and Limitations

Though the aforementioned questions suggest the scope of the case study, they do not explicitly mention the entire scenario captured by the data from the field work. Hence, the study’s scope covers some factors that are not directly attached to crime rates – even if quantitative data on crime rates indeed form an important part of the case study. Pedantic reliance on the quantitative data of crime rates can mute the factors that seem remote to the oscillation of crime rates but are found by our research (from field work, and through a review of literature) to have effects to the patrol system. Guided by the conceptual framework that will be explained in the succeeding sections, seemingly non-crime related factors like funding and community involvement are also tackled to the extent of their relevance to Chairman Silvano’s patrol reforms.

It must be reiterated that this study chiefly concerns itself with the reformed Barangay Little Baguio’s patrol as a way to prevent crime and thereby contribute to community safety. The past patrol system will only be discussed along its stark and meaningful differences with the reformed system; thus, this study should not be expected to explore the complete circumstances which explain the performance of the previous barangay council’s patrol system. Furthermore, this study does not include the new barangay council’s other reforms which may be aimed at community safety but have no direct impact on the patrol system.

Though the aforementioned questions suggest the scope of the case study, they do not explicitly mention the entire scenario captured by the data from the field work. Hence, the study’s scope covers some factors that are not directly attached to crime rates – even if quantitative data on crime rates indeed form an important part of the case study. Pedantic reliance on the quantitative data of crime rates can mute the factors that seem remote to the oscillation of crime rates but are found by our research (from field work, and through a review of literature) to have effects to the patrol system. Guided by the conceptual framework that will be explained in the succeeding sections, seemingly non-crime related factors like funding and community involvement are also tackled to the extent of their relevance to Chairman Silvano’s patrol reforms.

It must be reiterated that this study chiefly concerns itself with the reformed Barangay Little Baguio’s patrol as a way to prevent crime and thereby contribute to community safety. The past patrol system will only be discussed along its stark and meaningful differences with the reformed system; thus, this study should not be expected to explore the complete circumstances which explain the performance of the previous barangay council’s patrol system. Furthermore, this study does not include the new barangay council’s other reforms which may be aimed at community safety but have no direct impact on the patrol system.

Hypothesis

Based on the review of related literature and preliminary assessment of the Barangay Little Baguio, we forward three hypotheses.

Firstly, mere presence or establishment of a patrol system is not enough to see noticeable crime prevention.

Secondly, leadership, funding, manpower-training, equipment and stake-holder consultation allow barangay-level patrols to prevent and reduce crime.

Lastly, after achieving improved crime prevention, a reformed barangay-level patrol, is likely to have diminishing effectiveness because sustainability issues may arise and/or offenders find ways to circumvent the patrol system. A patrol effort is not passive and must be subjected to continuous assessment.

Organization of the Study

The case study is divided into four main parts: introduction, data, analysis and recommendations, and conclusion. The preceding part will focus on the gathered data. The first section will present a more detailed description of Barangay Little Baguio including the pertinent history and demographics. The exact pre-reform crime rates, crime-type prevalence, and pertinent supplementary information are presented. The past Barangay council’s responses to these crime rates are then mentioned. Afterwards, the implementation of reforms in the patrol system, the initiatives for reform, organization, financing, patrol recruitment, patrol training, equipment, and notable activities are discussed in detail. Imbedded in the discussion are the crucial differences between the current reforms and the previous responses of the past Barangay Council. The latter section of the succeeding Part will compare the crime rates and crime-type prevalence during the implementation of the reformed patrol system.

The third part is devoted to the analysis of data. The efficacy of the patrol reforms will be partially scrutinized in light of the relationships between the two sets of variables. Reasons for success or failure will be explained as well as other factors that might have also influenced the relationships. As always, the conceptual framework will be applied where useful. Recommendations to improve the patrol system will then be outlined. Possibilities, vulnerabilities, and predictions gleaned from the literature are also enumerated to aid stakeholders in gearing the patrol system for the challenges ahead.

Relationships and insights which have compelling evidences will be highlighted as possible hypotheses with wider generalizability and applicability to other barangays. However, caveats about Little Baguio’s particularities will be forwarded as reasons to be cautious in implying generalizability.